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
BANDAID DIPLOMACY: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF US
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
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"Most Americans are not well informed about Central America; many are misinformed; and some are outright disdainful about the cultural and social importance of the region."

The reason that the majority of the American public is "misinformed" can be, in this writer's opinion, attributed to their being "uninformed." Thus, the reason for this paper is to provide a historical synopsis of the United States' very long and very frustrating involvement in the affairs of Nicaragua, a nation that has had a direct influence on all of Central America. Beginning with the famed Monroe Doctrine, the U. S. has sought ways to formulate a viable foreign policy that would stabilize this strategically positioned southern neighbor-- No easy task. Nicaragua has been a source of consternation to U.S. policymakers for more than 150 years. Given the present chaotic situation, are we justified in blaming past policymakers and their foreign policy initiatives? To answer that question, this study will peel away the "diplomatic bandaids" that were applied by our diplomats as they attempted to heal our flawed relationship. The ultimate objective is to permit the "uninformed" reader to be better "informed" so that he may judge for himself the character of U.S. past involvement in Nicaragua, and make more informed judgements as to what approach we should be taking toward Nicaragua today.

STUDENT ESSAY

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BANDAID DIPLOMACY: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NICARAGUA

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SAM A. GRAY
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

1 MARCH 1984



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

**BANDAID DIPLOMACY: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY
TOWARDS NICARAGUA**

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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1 March 1984



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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

Beginning with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States has alternately struggled and ignored this hemisphere's need for a viable U.S. foreign policy. Nicaragua has particularly perplexed U.S. Presidents and their Secretaries of State since the turn of this century. During the first two decades of the 20th century, these policymakers used military intervention in the hope that it might restore some semblance of order. The last intervention, 1926-1933, saw U.S. Marines engaged in a Vietnam guerrilla type war that veterans of Vietnam would find familiar. Augusto C. Sandino, the spiritual forerunner of Fidel Castro and 'Che' Guevara, fought and won (politically speaking) against the U.S. Marines. Following this, the U.S. came under criticism because of the political and economic support provided through the years to the dictatorial Somoza family which maintained an iron grip on Nicaragua until the Sandinista rebels were successful in seizing control in July 1979. This take-over, coupled with their strong Cuban/Soviet affiliations, is presently posing a formidable national security threat to the U.S. In a rather dramatic and highly controversial move, U.S. policy has shifted to actually providing support to the counter-revolutionary forces who are seeking to overthrow this Cuban/Communist supported regime. These periods of U.S. involvement, scattered from 1823 to present, are highlighted by ambivalence, political faux pas, negligence and surprisingly enough, some moments of brilliance as the U.S. sought to make policy in a most volatile region. This essay will trace the progress of our foreign policy toward Central America, with focus on Nicaragua as it passed through periods of intense activity to periods of neglect.

BACKGROUND: U.S. POLICY AND LATIN AMERICA 1823-1910

During most of the 19th century, the United States paid little attention to Latin America. We were busy expanding westward, fighting a Civil War, and in general becoming a nation. However, when competition for influence in Latin America became intense at the end of the 19th century, the U.S. reinstated the notion of the Monroe Doctrine. This initiative, meant to deter European expansionist initiatives in the Caribbean, frightened many Latin American governments. They perceived the U.S., fresh from its victories in the Spanish American War, as imposing its will throughout the hemisphere.¹

It seems strange that the U.S. Government was attempting to define a foreign policy that would stem the tide of foreign encroachments in this hemisphere when it still had on the books the famed Monroe Doctrine which was foisted on Latin America by President James Monroe. When Monroe proclaimed his famed Monroe Doctrine in 1823, he was responding to fears that members of the Holy Alliance (Austria, Prussia and Russia) might intercede in Spain's behalf to foment a counterrevolution in Latin America and to counter Russian expansionism along North America's Pacific Coast.² So in these terms, the Monroe Doctrine unilaterally served notice to the world that all presently contemplated or future European attempts at colonization or interference/intervention in this part of the world would be resisted by the U.S.

So why the need to formulate a new foreign policy to ward off foreign encroachments at the end of the 19th century? The answer lies in a closer examination of the Monroe Doctrine and its original intent. It was much more than just a warning to the world of the United States' concern about foreign encroachments in this hemisphere. In actuality, the Doctrine was

the precursor of our own "manifest destiny" in this hemisphere. In essence it established a base line for future U.S. initiatives, i.e., it was a unilateral pronouncement that embodied the nationalistic and isolationist sentiments of a growing and increasingly assertive nation. The Doctrine very clearly revealed a new direction in America's purpose from that of being the forerunner of liberty and freedom in Latin America to that of defender of vested national self-interests it deemed important to the perpetuation of its presupposed national direction.

The European powers rightly interpreted this as probably the true nature of the Doctrine. They continued to violate the dictum almost at will from its inception in 1823 until the close of the 19th century when the U.S. finally realized that its national security was indeed in jeopardy.³ This should not be construed as a defamation of the Monroe Doctrine or even a slight against its historical significance. Rather, the Monroe Doctrine should be viewed as a harbinger of American expansionism - a symbolic gesture to the world of America's growing preeminence on both the northern and southern continents in this hemisphere.

As one might surmise, our renewed interest in Latin America at the end of the 19th century included much more than just reasons of our own self-serving form of nationalism. Actually, a strong majority of constituents in the United States agreed that foreign policy could and should play an important part in recovering financial losses caused by the depression of the 1890's. Many felt that the lack of foreign markets for U.S. manufactured goods contributed to the depression. This belief supported the notion that a more vigorous foreign policy could and therefore should be used to obtain the badly needed foreign markets.⁴

By the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S.'s policy of isola-

tionism appeared to be dying. It was dying because our growing commercial interests were being expanded beyond national boundaries. In fact a new consciousness seemed to be stirring in the United States. It was a consciousness of strength and with it a new appetite to demonstrate this strength. The Pan-American movement was initiated by the U.S. in 1889 with its main objective to expand and promote foreign trade. By 1900 the U.S. had truly become the world's foremost industrial power and had acquired claims stretching from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean. Additionally, economic interests seemed to demand that we continue this expansionism but at the same time protect those gains that had been made.

Translating this new national feeling into foreign policy became the task of a group of gentlemen with a surprising homogeneity. These men, all from the industrialized Northeast, were the quasi-aristocracy and were devoted to promoting U.S. interests abroad. They were quite capable of doing this because these emerging foreign policymakers were to become a series of U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State during the first two decades of the 20th century. In order to have an insight into their collective foreign policy philosophy, one need only hear the words of Elihu Root, Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909, as he glorified his boss, Theodore Roosevelt, as the "greatest conservative force for the protection of property and capital."⁵

With the pursuit of economic advantage becoming a leading motif of U.S. policy towards Latin America under the administration of William Howard Taft, economic focus had shifted from the promotion of trade to protection of investments. This shift was translated into official U.S. policy in 1904 when President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed what would become known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This Corollary was designed to serve two purposes. First, it would halt further encroachments in the

Caribbean and Central America by European powers. In fact it was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, a noted stategist of the day, who, in 1890, said that the Caribbean, after the building of the Canal (either through Panama or Nicaragua), would no longer be a "comparatively deserted nook of ocean," but a region in which great powers would have a strategic interest. Mahan quite correctly pointed out that several positions of strategic importance were in the hands of weak and unstable Caribbean and Central American nations, e.g. Nicaragua and Panama. All in all his message illustrated the very real danger facing the U.S. if action was not taken.⁶ Second, the Roosevelt Corollary added confirmation of the necessity to intervene where deemed necessary in order to protect American lives and property (investments) and to help maintain internal order.⁷

Formulating foreign policy was one thing but executing it was something else entirely. President Roosevelt and his successors had to work primarily through the Department of State and the fledgling foreign service. Few American ministers or ambassadors had any previous experience or, for that matter, any knowledge of the language or customs of the countries to which they were accredited. Long before and certainly after 1900, the best (European) posts went to the wealthiest and the most politically influential while the unattractive posts of Central America and the Caribbean went to lesser personages. Thus through diplomatically unqualified representation, many of our more unfortunate episodes (political faux pas) in our early execution of Central American policy can be, one might surmise, traced to their ineptness. After all the most able bodied Secretary of State could not make wise decisions without accurate information from his appointed field representatives. Conversely the wisest policy could not be executed with any degree of success when there

was a lack of political acumen and/or judgement by those in the field.⁸ Further, neither the field nor Washington were blessed with the instant communications we take for granted today. Success or failure depended on how the diplomat on the spot was able to make and then carry out decisions in the name of the United States without the luxury of instant counsel afforded our diplomatic corps today.

It would be totally unfair to leave this story with only one side told. Our seeming ineptness in carrying out foreign policy with our Latin neighbors cannot be blamed entirely on the U.S.'s fledgling diplomatic corps. Actually, "physical hardships, vexations of spirit, dread diseases, and in some cases death itself" attended these early pioneers in the diplomatic corps.⁹ This is not the whole story of adversity because the nations to which the "ill-starred agents were accredited," were themselves victims of "misfortunes of the greatest magnitude."¹⁰

If diplomatic negotiations were failing to accomplish U.S. foreign policy objectives, the only recourse for a quick and sure solution was through military intervention. Central American and Caribbean nations, whose economic and political problems often led to fear for the safety of American lives and property, most often were the recipients of the heavy hand of U.S. intervention. Cuba (where the Rough Rider himself took an active military hand), Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua ushered in the 20th century with U.S. forces occupying their land. These occupations provided a fair measure of short term stability. The long term effects were unsatisfactory as we can readily see by the present day situations in both Cuba and Nicaragua. The majority of these military interventions were under the shibboleth of the Roosevelt Corollary.¹¹

The Roosevelt Corollary (also known as "Dollar" or "Big Stick" diplomacy) simply "added a reaffirmation of a U.S. policy of intervention

to protect U.S. citizens and property and to help maintain order."¹² Was this a smoke screen for what one could better describe as United States imperialism? Professor John H. Latane, a noted professor of American History and International Law at John Hopkins University, testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on January 27, 1927 that "the South American countries have charged that (the Roosevelt Corollary to) the Monroe Doctrine has been converted from a policy of benevolent protection into a cloak for imperialistic aggression."¹³

President Roosevelt added clout to his Corollary when, in 1904 before Congress, he said:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. ¹⁴

The feeble state of Nicaragua presented a fine opportunity to put muscle into Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

NICARAGUA: U.S. POLICY - MARINES - INTERVENTION -- 1910-1925

Nicaragua, for over a century, had been the scene of perpetual conflicts between Conservative and Liberal Parties. The Conservatives were headquartered in the city of Granada, the center of the landowning and merchant classes, while the Liberals, largely professionals and artisans, were centered in the city of Leon. Nicaragua's revolutions pivoted on these two oligarchical groups as they struggled for national power. The Conservatives held the reins of power and stabilized the country from 1863 until 1893. This power base changed hands in 1893 when a successful Liberal

revolt placed Jose Santos Zelaya in power.¹⁵

The United States interest in Nicaragua was, like that of early Spanish explorers, primarily geographic. During the early colonial period, Spanish engineers pointed out to their Kings that it was quite possible to cut a waterway across Nicaragua. Nature had endowed Nicaragua with a huge volcanic lake which covers approximately one quarter of the country's breath, and since the navigable San Juan River could be linked to the lake, Nicaragua was an ideal site for a sea-to-sea canal.¹⁶ In 1897, President McKinley was presented a unanimous decision by a special Presidential commission charged with selecting the best site for a canal through Central America. Based on their findings, he recommended to Congress that monies be appropriated for the construction of a transisthmian canal through Nicaragua.¹⁷ Congress disregarded this recommendation and, in 1902, appropriated monies for the construction of the canal in Panama which was completed twelve years later.

The decision to build the canal in Panama literally shattered a Nicaraguan dream, especially among wealthier members of the Conservative and Liberal Parties who would be prime beneficiaries of such an undertaking. If one were searching for a historical turning point, this would be an excellent choice. As the United States turned its full economic attention to building the Panama Canal, Jose Santos Zelaya, the Liberal President who was heartily despised at home and abroad, demonstrated a "coolness toward the United States that turned into a festering resentment."¹⁸ In 1907, Zelaya - fast becoming the chief troublemaker in the area, used a border incident as a pretext to launch an attack against his northern neighbor, Honduras. Nicaragua easily defeated Honduras and by sheer momentum was on the verge of putting El Salvador on

the ropes as well. The prospects of Nicaragua becoming a dominant and hostile power to the United States in Central America was alarming.¹⁹

The U.S. and Mexico, incited largely by Zelaya's arrogance and potential danger to all of Central America, insisted that all affected parties come to Washington to settle their differences. In 1907, the Central American Convention, as it became known was convened and from that the Central American Court for adjudicating disputes in the area was born. Many political historians view this Convention as a landmark in U.S. Central American policy. The five Central American nations participating, to include Nicaragua, pledged the following: 1) provide regional stability, 2) guarantee non-intervention in each others' affairs, and 3) establish a non-recognition policy of any government coming to power through a coup d'état or revolution.²⁰ The last provision, strengthened by President Woodrow Wilson's extension of the de jure policy, rather by the internationally accepted de facto, remained, as will be seen, to plague the U.S. in Central America.²¹ The de jure policy, as noted, was a marked departure from the practice of international law as adhered to by most all world powers.

Even though Zelaya was a signatory to the agreements hammered out during the Central American Conference, he continued to be a troublemaker. Zelaya, irate over the U.S. decision to build the canal in Panama, made overtures to the Japanese and British governments by inviting them to build a competing waterway through Nicaragua. This proved too much for the United States and U.S. policymakers began to look seriously for ways to bring about Zelaya's downfall. Several key issues were the genesis of U.S. concern. First, the U.S. had assumed, through the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, sole trusteeship for the Caribbean and Central America and to protect it from foreign intervention. Second, the U.S. had assumed

responsibility for safeguarding American foreign investments and interests. These interests were economic in nature and the construction of a second canal by a foreign power would jeopardize U.S. economic dominance. Third, from a strategic standpoint, a second canal, under other than U.S. control, would threaten national security which the Panama Canal was an integral part. As we shall see, national security will continue to be a central consideration in determining policy in the Americas.²²

In 1909, the U.S. was given a convenient opportunity for ending Zelaya's wearisome dictatorship. General Emilio Chamorro, a member of one of Granada's prominent Conservative families, had landed secretly on Nicaragua's east coast to start a revolution against Zelaya. One of his assistants, Adolfo Diaz - secretary/accountant for the American company of Rosario and Light Mines - would become a key player in U.S. policy over the next several years. The Rosario and Light Mines, incidentally, had as its legal counsel none other than Secretary of State Knox. During the ensuing fight, Zelaya captured and subsequently executed two American soldiers of fortune who were assisting the Conservative insurgents by laying mines in a nearby river to sabotage government ships. Even though these two American citizens had forfeited their claims to U.S. protection by their irregular status, Secretary of State Philander C. Knox severed diplomatic relations with Nicaragua.²³ On the heels of this diplomatic move, four hundred U.S. marines were ordered into Nicaragua to protect American lives and property. In reality, they actually came to assist the Conservative rebels. Zelaya, seeing that his back was against the wall, wisely fled Nicaragua into self imposed exile. The leadership vacuum was filled when the Nicaraguan Congress selected a Leon Liberal named Dr. Jose Madriz as the new President. The U.S. refused to recognize the Madriz Government and held to

the weakly supported argument that the minority Conservative Party revolutionaries represented the majority of the Nicaraguan people.²⁴ The war continued for the next two years and the Conservative forces would have lost if not for the fact that the U.S. Marines had control of the main port of Bluefields which was now being used to funnel in more than a million dollars worth of supplies being provided by American businessmen who had covetous economic eyes on Nicaragua.²⁵

Since there were no road networks capable of carrying needed supplies from the western side of the country to the eastern, Madriz could not support his troops operating in the east without the use of Bluefields. Thus he found himself in an untenable situation and had to follow Zelaya into exile. On August 20, 1910, the Madriz Government collapsed and was replaced by a pro-U.S. regime headed by Conservative General Estrada as President and Adolfo Diaz as Vice-President.²⁶ The U.S. had exercised a new power in Central America, i.e., by refusing to recognize the duly constituted Liberal Government following Zelaya's ouster, the U.S. used its political and military intervention to install a government of its choosing. To highlight this, an American Charge de Affairs to Nicaragua wrote some years later: "Whenever the American representative mentioned to the head of a de facto government (Madriz's in this instance) a number of things which the U.S. desired, intimated that compliance with these wishes might help along recognition. the U.S. was using Machpolitik or economic imperialism in a very overt manner."²⁷ As one Nicaraguan observer wrote, "the overthrow of Zelaya's presidency was achieved with a spectacular blend of diplomatic offensive, military strength and North American capital."²⁸

The end result was that the Conservatives had recovered political power, and the influence of the United States was a potent factor in achieving this result. For the next two years (1910-1912), the economic

and political situation in Nicaragua deteriorated rapidly. The nation was burdened with debt and permeated with distrust. The Madriz Government had left a substantial sum in the treasury but this was squandered almost immediately. To offset this, the government began "wildly printing paper money."²⁹ Additionally, there was a large foreign debt that had not been paid. European creditors now demanded payments. Washington immediately came to Nicaragua's aid by arranging private bank loans. The intent was noble but unfortunately much of the money immediately began to line the pockets of corrupt politicians.

In an attempt to aid recovery, Washington sent in one of its more able diplomats, Thomas C. Dawson, to sort out the chaos that existed. Dawson found the country in terrible financial shape and very unsettled. He managed to get the rival factions (Conservatives and Liberals) to set aside personal differences temporarily and discuss national problems. They agreed to allow an American customs collector to apportion receipts between foreign creditors and local government. This was instrumental in paving the way for additional loans from New York bankers which assisted in retiring foreign loans and provided necessary capital for government operations. This State Department sponsored plan was never ratified by the Senate but was carried through by an executive agreement signed by President William H. Taft. Thus "dollar diplomacy" was legitimized and was off and running in grand style in Nicaragua.³⁰

During the time frame 1910-1912, the political and economic situation, even with U.S. assistance, deteriorated rapidly. The rebellion had disrupted the country in too many ways for a quick and easy solution. In 1912, the temporary presidency of Estrada was replaced by Adolfo Diaz. The Liberals could not tolerate the Conservative Government another moment and

revolted. At first it appeared that the insurgents might win. Under the command of a one time Zelayista Liberal, Benjamin Zeledon, they won one victory after another. Dana G. Munro, U.S. Charge de Affairs during the time frame of this episode, observed that "the U.S. could hardly permit the overthrow of the Conservatives."³¹ U.S. prestige was at stake. Those standing to suffer the most with a Liberal victory would be the Department of State and the New York bankers. The only recourse was bring back the American warships and the U.S. Marines.

Under the able command of Marine Colonel Joseph Pendleton, the U.S. Marine force of 2,700 joined the remnants of the Conservative forces to corner and capture Zeledon. Thomas W. Walker, a noted Latin American historian, wrote that Zeledon was subsequently assassinated by the Conservative troops as the U.S. looked the other way. Zeledon's body was dragged through the little town of Niquinohomo where a "short skinny, seventeen-year-old boy was among those who witnessed government troops kicking the lifeless form. This seemingly insignificant teenager who later commented that the scene made his blood boil with rage was Augusto Cesar Sandino."³²

Following the Conservative defeat, all U.S. Marines except for a 100-man embassy guard departed Nicaragua. This stay-behind force would remain in Nicaragua until 1925. Their presence accomplished two things: 1) it showed the Nicaraguans and other Latin American countries that the U.S. was determined to prevent further revolutions, and 2) it served to retain the minority Conservative Party in power.³³ U.S. armed intervention in Nicaragua set a unique policy precedent. U.S. Marines, as an extension of politics, had to fight a small war to make peace, to uphold U.S. prestige and exercise suzerainty in the region, to oversee and supervise elections, to maintain a constitutional legitimacy which the U.S. could recognize and,

last but not least, "to protect American lives and property."³⁴

The U.S. now had two options: 1) keep U.S. Marines in-country indefinitely to maintain this artificial situation or 2) organize a non-partisan military force that could relieve the U.S. of their praetorian functions of maintaining constitutional legitimacy. With regards to the latter, the Conservatives had little interest in creating an efficient National Guard or Army because their security was, for the foreseeable future going to be guaranteed by the U.S. Marines. As a sop to the U.S. they did organize an ill equipped, poorly paid, and understaffed Army. As historian Richard Millett noted, "Perhaps the only redeeming feature of this military system was the rather small portion of official government revenues assigned to it."³⁵ Although no great efforts went into building a viable military force, the idea was never completely disregarded.

Between 1912 and 1925, the U.S. Marine "legation guard" remained in Nicaragua. During this timeframe, the umbrella of U.S. protection permitted one Conservative President to succeed another unopposed. Adolfo Diaz, who, like a bad check, will show up again and again, was followed by General Emiliano Chamorro. Prior to Chamorro leaving office in 1920, he manipulated election results so that his uncle, Diego Manuel Chamorro, could become president. This method of controlling the country was in its infancy and would soon be elevated to an art form by the Somoza family. Chamorro's uncle died unexpectedly in 1923 and was succeeded by Vice President Bartolome Martinez who was a member of the anti-Chamorro faction within the Conservative Party. Martinez, by Constitutional law, could not succeed himself in the 1924 elections. However, as an active member of the Conservative Republican Party (a hybrid political party), he was successful in assembling a rather controversial political slate. The slate was

composed of Carlos Solorzano, a Conservative, for President, and for Vice President, Juan Bautista Sarcasa, a staunch Liberal. Running against this duo was none other than General Emiliano Chamorro who was again eligible for reelection. The U.S., wanting to legitimize this election by being noticeably absent, did not provide the customary election observers. Their absence opened the door to government threats of force, a more than normal amount of ballot box stuffing and ample opportunities for voting fraud. When the vote was counted, Chamorro was soundly defeated.³⁶

President Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg were fairly well convinced that the newly elected coalition of Conservatives and Liberals (Solorzano and Sarcasa) Government, was able to stand on its own two feet and decided that the presence of U.S. troops was no longer necessary.³⁷ Also by 1925, the New York bankers had more than recouped all funds loaned to the Nicaraguan government and because of this did not voice any strong objections to the proposed marine withdrawal.³⁸ The withdrawal, however, proved to be a miscalculation. Newly elected Carlos Solorzano viewed the withdrawal with alarm and requested that the order be suspended. Solorzano had reasons for this request. One, the National Army he inherited was, as previously noted, totally disorganized and militarily ineffective.³⁹ Two, Solorzano also realized that the coalition government was not a marriage made in heaven and signs of strain were being manifested with each passing day. Further, arch rival Chamorro was vocalizing his disgust, and rumors of impending revolution were more than backyard gossip.⁴⁰

The Department of State, seeing an opportunity to bargain once again, readily agreed to delay the troop withdrawal if the newly elected government would permit the creation of an "American-trained, nonpartisan constabulary." As Millett observed, "the creation of armed forces of this

type became a pet project of the Department.⁴¹ Solorzano, feeling the fingers of manipulation tightening around his administration's throat, yielded to the pressure of the State Department. This act gave birth to Nicaragua's famed National Guard. With this decision, the last U.S. Marine contingent departed Nicaraguan soil on August 4, 1925. A short three weeks later the Solorzano Government started to come apart at the seams.⁴²

Emiliano Chamorro was now in a position to reap the fruits of dissension he so patiently sowed throughout the nation. In October 1925 he made a dramatic return and overthrew Solorzano. He immediately purged the system of all Liberals. This was an act of purification partially designed to satisfy, he thought, the desires of the U.S.. That was his first error. The second error made was his attempt to take over personal control of the National Guard. Chamorro misread the present attitude of the U.S. Government. His brand of pure Conservatism no longer appealed to U.S. policymakers. Further, his desire to take over the National Guard flew directly in the face of the State Department's pet project. Chamorro found himself in the middle of two opposing factions. The U.S. on one side refusing to recognize his government because it was formed through a coup d'état which violated the Central American Convention's agreements of 1907 and 1923. On the other side, the Liberals were busily arming themselves and preparing for the showdown that was sure to come.⁴³ Under these pressures, Chamorro resigned on October 30, 1926. He attempted to name a successor but he was not successful.

MARINES - SANDINO - GUERRILLA WARFARE — 1925-1933

With Chamorro out of the picture (temporarily), it was necessary to find an acceptable replacement. It would be highly desirable to select a

candidate that would be acceptable to the U.S. The one chosen was the old protege of Presidents Taft and Wilson and now of Coolidge - Conservative Adolfo Diaz. As Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Democrat from Montana noted:

"Our State Department, throwing honor to the dogs, recognized Adolfo Diaz of Nicaragua...Diaz: a perfect rubber stamp, a yes man - Don Adolfo, sitting in the President's palace in Managua, might be mistaken for the little Victrola dog listening to his master's voice...He is an agile little Nicaraguan who has been thrust through the little window of presidency several times to unlock the house to certain American bankers and their faithful servant, our State Department."⁴⁴

Not only was Senator Wheeler against Diaz but the Liberals were as well. Under the previously ousted Sarcasa, the Liberals established a rival government on Nicaragua's east coast. Mexico, having their own problems with the U.S., showed their disdain towards the U.S. by extending moral and military support to Sarcasa. President Coolidge now had two major hemispheric problems facing his administration - Mexico and Nicaragua.⁴⁵ The only solution, at least for the Nicaraguan Conservatives, was to once again turn to Washington for help.

President Coolidge responded with the decision to escalate significantly the degree and impact of U.S. intervention from purely diplomatic pressure and indirect military support of the Conservative Government to a policy of diplomatic ultimata backed by military force. The last thing, however, the U.S. wanted to do was involve itself in the revolution. As long as there was a glimmer of hope to obtain a diplomatic settlement of this civil war, that would be the course to take. As time passed, it became increasingly evident that the U.S. was being drawn into armed conflict against the Liberal insurgents.⁴⁶ In August 1926, increasing disorders around the proclaimed Liberal neutral zones along the Nicaraguan east coast necessitated the landing of U.S. Marines at

Bluefields. Their orders were very simple, protect American lives and property. As a start, they also created neutral zones of their own to protect American property and lives.⁴⁷

The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the Liberals were becoming stronger with the influx of weapons and ammunition from Mexico. Additionally, the dispute threatened to become a test of the relative prestige of the U.S. and Mexico in Central America. The U.S. was being boxed into a corner and it was necessary to arrive at a quick and satisfactory conclusion to the problem before it got totally out of hand.

The Coolidge Administration was also coming under increased domestic pressure concerning the Central American situation. The press and congress called upon the President to justify U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of another nation. Senator Wheeler of Montana, an outspoken critic of the Coolidge Administration, provides an example of the tenor of the criticism being leveled against U.S. involvement in Nicaragua: "To all intents and purposes Mr. Kellogg and Mr. Coolidge are waging an undeclared war against the little Republic of Nicaragua....the chief responsibility for this crime against liberty and republicanism and good morals must rest with the executive department of our Government."⁴⁸

The President responded by sending his personal mediator, the highly respected Henry L. Stimpson, to Nicaragua.⁴⁹ Before departing Washington, "Coolidge told Stimpson to go down and settle things, doing whatever was necessary. The President was tired of the Nicaraguan mess and wanted to get it off of his hands."⁵⁰ Given a wide latitude for action, Stimpson could do almost anything he thought was appropriate if it would end the Nicaraguan war and extricate the U.S. On May 4, 1927 and in a very straightforward manner, he laid out the following terms to General Jose Maria Moncada, a truly brilliant military commander of the Liberal forces,

and to Liberal President Sarcasa at Tipitapa: 1) a general ceasefire was to go into effect immediately; 2) all arms and ammunition would be handed over to the U.S. Marines located at the U.S. Embassy in Managua. Once collected, they would be held until such time as an effective non-partisan National Guard could be organized and trained under U.S. military supervision; 3) along with this surrender of arms, there would be a general amnesty given; and finally, 4) an agreement to a U.S. supervised election would be held in 1928. Adolfo Diaz, virtually devoid of freedom to differ with his mentor the Department of State, dutifully affixed his signature beside side that of Moncada's and Sarcasa's. It is believed that Moncada and Sarcasa readily signed the agreement because they could foresee a Liberal victory in the 1928 elections which would, this time, be sanctioned and legitimized by the U.S. Government. Thus the Pact of Espino Negro accomplished two things: 1) it had all the appearances of bringing an end to hostilities and, 2) for all practical purposes it brought both parties, Liberals and Conservatives, under U.S. domination.⁵¹

Stimpson walked away from Tipitapa with the belief that he had presided at the funeral of the Liberal-Conservative civil war. In reality, he was the unwitting witness to the birth of a war of liberation and a concept of revolution that was still a half a century away, i.e., a "peoples victory" in 1979 by the Sandinista rebels. Two Liberal generals seldom mentioned in historical literature but very active behind the scenes would now emerge to change the course of Nicaraguan history. One was a realist and a hustler by the name of Anastasio Somoza Garcia. He was wide and heavy, a supposed descendant of illustrious ancestors, a used car salesman with an unusual fluency in American English and a shaky legal record who completely threw his lot with the Liberal's new patron, the

United States. The other, Augusto Cesar Sandino, was an idealist and a visionary. Unlike Somoza, he was short and skinny, an illegitimate child of an Indian woman and a white small landowner, once a fugitive from Nicaraguan justice and recently returned from working as a laborer in the Mexican oil fields. Of all the Liberal military commanders, Sandino refused outright to abide by the Pact. He took followers loyal to him and retired to the mountains of northern Nicaragua where, for the next six years, he would organize and captain what would be the forerunner of later even more successful guerrilla wars in Latin America. The destinies of these two men would not only alter Nicaragua's history but also the history of Central America and perhaps even the entire hemisphere.⁵²

From remote Las Segovias, a heavily jungled mountain range along the Honduran/Nicaraguan border, Sandino slowly gathered his guerrilla force.⁵³ Because the Americans and the Nicaraguans were busy working out details for the upcoming 1928 elections, Sandino was afforded the luxury of non-interference at a very critical and vulnerable time in his reorganization scheme. Establishment politicians viewed Sandino as a nuisance, a bandit with a police record who posed no political threat to anyone. This perception was shattered on June 16, 1927 in a small village called Ocotal. Sandino's forces, using conventional tactics, attacked a National Guard unit garrisoned there. Although caught by surprise, the National Guardsmen and their Marine commander/advisers were able to hold out until reinforcements arrived. The first on the scene to assist the garrison was a squadron of U.S. Marine DeHaviland aircraft led by Major Ross E. Rowell. Carrying bombs and armed with machineguns, they attacked Sandino's forces. Use of aircraft in this manner was historical because it was "the first organized dive bombing attack in history - long before the Nazi Luftwaffe was credited with the innovation."⁵⁴

The air attack lasted a devastating forty-five minutes before the rebels could break off contact and flee to the protection of the surrounding hills. U.S. casualties were light with one Marine killed and one wounded. The National Guard had only three wounded. The Battle of Ocotal was the only major defeat suffered by Sandino during the next six years of conflict. Learning from the mistake of using conventional tactics against a superior force such as the U.S. Marines, Sandino, through trial and error, developed what is known today as classical guerrilla tactics. The Marines, and the National Guard force they were charged to train and equip, found themselves engaged in a new type of warfare. They were repeatedly caught in ambushes that lasted but a few minutes. In those few minutes, they quite often suffered serious casualties. The Marines found that air cover over the advancing columns deterred guerrilla attack. However, as soon as the air cover left, they could expect an attack. These ambushes were not meant to destroy the Marine and National Guard force, but inflict as many casualties and as much damage as possible with minimum risk to guerrillas.⁵⁵

As a result of Sandino's activities, the Marines and the National Guard eventually were bogged down in costly Vietnam-type war. This is not to say that there were no successes. As an example, famous generals such as the U.S. Marine's "Chesty" Puller and the U.S. Army's Matthew B. Ridgeway literally "cut their teeth" as young officers in the jungles of Nicaragua pursuing the elusive Sandino. Puller developed some classic anti-guerrilla tactics that were highly successful. Unfortunately, these lessons were lost over time and had to be completely relearned during the Vietnam War. Even though the Americans were beginning to learn how to fight in the environment of a guerrilla type war, Sandino was able to

maintain the initiative. As a matter of fact, the longer Sandino eluded the Marines, the more embarrassing his movement and the Nicaraguan situation became in Washington. When the Naval Appropriations Bill came up for consideration in Congress, Senate opponents tried to tack on amendments to get the Marines out of Nicaragua and to force the President to ask Congress for consent to use forces in future conflicts of this nature. The President had sufficient support in Congress at the time to nullify the amendments.⁵⁶

President Coolidge was under considerable pressure to resolve the situation in Nicaragua. He was approaching a presidential election year where the Central American crisis could become a political football. In support of the Coolidge policy, the keynote speaker at the Republican Convention in Kansas City that summer told assembled delegates "that the one undeviating principle for which America stood was the protection of American citizens in their rights of life and property..."⁵⁷ The Republican platform was most supportive of the Coolidge policy in Nicaragua, i.e., America was obligated to protect U.S. citizens and their property and to carry out the election agreement as prescribed by the Stimpson accord. Two weeks later, the Democratic Convention was in session in Houston. There a different theme was being proclaimed. Dollar Diplomacy, according to the Democrats, had led the U.S. into an undeclared war in Nicaragua. They also saw the promise of free elections, supervised by U.S. Marines, as farcical. The Democratic platform was against involvement in the foreign affairs of other countries for the purpose of protecting these foreign governments from attacks by outside powers. In other words, the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary were, in their opinion, no longer viable.⁵⁸

Coolidge's loss to Herbert C. Hoover was indicative of several things.

The public opinion aspect of U.S. policy towards Central America was difficult to measure or even influence (the public's positive reaction to the October 1983 invasion on Grenada as opposed to Congress's initial negative reaction serves as a modern day example).⁵⁹ No one liked to hear about U.S. Marines casualties, but hostility toward American intervention had not reached such proportions that either Coolidge or Hoover felt the need to bring the troops home. Further, the majority of Congress supported Stimpson's agreement even if it meant keeping U.S. forces in Nicaragua.

Meanwhile in Nicaragua, Sandino had vowed to disrupt these elections. As election day drew nearer, it did seem that Sandino was capable of following up on his threat. On the field, he was rapidly developing his rebels into an effective and cunning fighting force. Throughout the region, he counted on a willing network of spies and informers who kept him always a couple of steps ahead of the Marines and government troops.⁶⁰ However, stepped up government security frustrated his threat to disrupt elections. Both Liberals and Conservatives agreed that the 1928 elections were by far the fairest ever held in Nicaragua. The victor, with some fifty-eight percent of the vote, was Jose Maria Moncada, Sandino's former commander.⁶¹ As previously noted, the winner in the Presidential race in the U.S. was Hoover who inherited Nicaragua's problems much as Presidents Johnson and Nixon would with the Vietnam situation.

Sandino continued to press the struggle against his number one professed enemy - the U.S. Marines. Nagged by Sandino's persistence, Hoover reluctantly decided to leave a large Marine contingent in Nicaragua following the elections. One of the Marines missions was to carry out the promised training of the National Guard. As a concession to his critics, he did reduce the number of Marines from 2,700 to 2,000. Moncada, a highly

successful military leader in his own right, became increasingly frustrated over two factors: 1) the lack of military victories against Sandino and his guerrillas and 2) the U.S.'s determination to maintain a non-partisan National Guard. Moncada rightfully believed that a non-partisan National Guard would never have party loyalty so important in the manipulation of Nicaraguan politics.

One thing that guerrilla organizations always seem to have on their side is time. During the late 1920s, this was no exception. As the war continued, it created bigger and bigger financial and manpower burdens on the Governments of Nicaragua and the U.S. As the National Guard became a stronger force through military training and aid, Sandino's guerrillas likewise grew stronger. Sandino's efforts against the "Yankee Imperialists" were not going unnoticed in the rest of the hemisphere. Major General John A. Lejune, Marine Corps Commandant at that time, noted: Sandino "has become a symbol down here in Central America."⁶² This new symbol was humiliating Lejune's Marines and was destroying the notion that United States military forces could dictate at will all political settlements. Sandino's elimination was deemed imperative. Unfortunately, it was easier said than done. From 1929 on, the effects of the Great Depression upon the economy of Nicaragua seemed to increase support for Sandino. As he became stronger, he expanded his area of operations. This was evidenced by guerrilla incursions into the western zones, which had previously been free from attacks.⁶³

Henry L. Stimpson, the statesman who had negotiated the Pact of Espino Negro with Moncada in 1927, was now Hoover's Secretary of State. In 1931, Stimpson, a Secretary of State who at least had a modicum of personal experience with Nicaragua, announced a schedule for complete "Nicaraguization" of the war. The first steps toward this end would be

the immediate start of a phased withdrawal of all American forces. Following the completion of yet another U.S.-supervised general national election in 1932, all U.S. forces would depart Nicaragua. Both U.S. military leaders and Department of State personnel had strong reservations about the handover of the National Guard to the Nicaraguan authorities. One reason was that Sandino's guerrilla activities had prevented U.S. authorities from training a viable native officer corps. The U.S. Marines had assumed these leadership positions within the National Guard. These U.S. personnel were of the highest caliber. For example, the commander of the Guard's Company M was a young Marine Captain by the name of Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller. Richard Millett wrote the following concerning the outstanding reputation of Puller's company: "Though often in combat, Company M was never defeated and became, in time, the terror of guerrilla bands throughout Central Nicaragua."⁶⁴

A thought was given to leaving these Marine officers behind until they could be properly substituted. When this idea finally worked its way into the White House and into the hands of the U.S.'s newest President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, he promptly vetoed it. He had no intentions of compromising his newly promulgated "Good Neighbor Policy" by leaving any U.S. military behind after the soon to be elected new Nicaraguan administration assumed office. A principal reason for Roosevelt's stand on this was his personal belief in the nonintervention aspect of his Good Neighbor Policy. After all, this obligation of nonintervention was agreed to by all the American nations, though it was usually considered a "signing of a temperance pledge" by the United States alone. It was true that we had been the principal sinner and Roosevelt's desire that all Marines depart the Americas was his way of showing his sincerity to abide by the dictums

described in his policy of Good Neighborism.

On January 1, 1933, just after Juan Bautista Sarcasa had been sworn in as Nicaragua's newest President, his nephew, General Anastasio Somoza Garcia relieved U.S. Marine General Calvin B. Matthews and became the new Director of Nicaragua's National Guard. Twenty-four hours later, after some twenty years of presence, the last U.S. Marine departed Nicaraguan soil.⁶⁵ Their withdrawal also marked the end of a six year war against Sandino, who could no longer maintain that his operations were a protest against foreign intervention. He responded to the announced determination of the government to end hostilities by entering into peace negotiations with the Sarcasa Government the very day the Marines departed.⁶⁶

On February 2, 1933, President Sarcasa and Augusto C. Sandino signed a peace agreement. The terms of the agreement were extremely generous. For example, amnesty was granted to Sandino and his followers for all hostile acts committed against the government since Stimpson's 1927 Tipitapa (Pact of Espino Negro) Agreement. Further, Sandino was allowed to keep one hundred men under arms in the Rio Coco area of the Las Segovias. Finally, the government agreed to undertake a public works project and provide agricultural land to the former guerrillas. With this, Sandino declared his fight for Nicaraguan liberty a closed affair.

Sarcasa retained the nagging feeling that Sandino's popularity posed a potential threat to his newly formed government. This threat, real or imagined, paled in comparison to the growing menace of the National Guard under his nephew Somoza. Unlike Sarcasa, the National Guard was not so quick to forgive the beating they took from Sandino's guerrillas. The Guardsmen looked for revenge and at every opportunity incidents were provoked that resulted in the unnecessary death of the Sandinista guerrillas. Sandino, in an unusual move, wrote a note to Sarcasa, pledging

his support of loyalty if Sarcasa should ever decide to go against the "unconstitutional" National Guard. Sarcasa and the U.S. unfortunately paid little attention to Sandino's cries of alarm.

Somoza, on the other hand, paid attention and decided that something must be done to end the Sandino business once and for all. With this purpose in mind and in order to stop rumors of a possible Somoza led coup d'état, he agreed to sign a new peace arrangement between the National Guard and Sandino. This was done under the rubric of preventing future hostilities between the opposing camps. To honor the occasion, President Sarcasa gave Sandino a farewell dinner prior the latter's departure for Las Segovias which was scheduled for the following day. The dinner was cordial and an air of friendship, though guarded, seemed to prevail. In good spirits, Sandino left the party to return to his lodgings. Not far from the Palace, he was apprehended by a group of National Guardsmen, driven to a nearby airfield, and summarily executed by Guardsman Eddie Monterrey, a personal friend of Somoza's.⁶⁷

With Sandino out of the way, Somoza moved quickly and ruthlessly to destroy the remaining Sandinista guerrillas. Left leaderless, the Sandinista organization crumbled. As an historical footnote, Somoza by eliminating Sandino unwittingly became midwife to the legend of Sandino as a popular folk hero who would become the larger than life champion of nationalism throughout the Americas in coming years. Thus by 1933, Somoza had erased the immediate problem of Sandino which allowed him to concentrate full attention to taking over the entire country.

There is no clear evidence to support the claim that the U.S. was involved in the assassination of Sandino. That said, there was a wide belief throughout Latin America that the crime had American origins. As

noted historian Neil Macaulay stated: "The United States was in fact guilty to the extent of supplying the murder weapon - the American trained and equipped Nicaraguan National Guard."⁶⁸ Further, the emergence of a powerful and ambitious political figure in the form of Anastasio Somoza Garcia must be considered. Clearly, he ordered Sandino's murder. U.S. government denial of complicity in Sandino's murder when combined with concurrent support to Somoza by making the National Guard stronger through stepped-up military aid only made it more susceptible to the charge that nonintervention was simply a pretext for the acceptance of a strongman or dictator who could ride roughshod over all opposition. Macaulay further observed that "Somoza was in effect a time bomb, planted in Managua by the Hoover administration, and Franklin Roosevelt allowed it to explode."⁶⁹

"GOOD NEIGHBOR" - SOMOZA DYNASTY - COLD WAR — 1933-1972

The lessons learned by the U.S. in Nicaragua were harsh ones. U.S. policy, backed by military forces in the form of active intervention (Gunboat/Big Stick Diplomacy), had become costly and counterproductive. For the first time, under Sandino's pressure, the U.S. was faced by true Latin American nationalism and demands for socio-economic reform. As if by coincidence or simply by force of events, not only were the Latins restless for change but so was the American public. The task to transcend this inter-American hostility and assuage American public restiveness was therefore laid at the feet of the incoming Democratic Administration in 1933. With the intent of putting an end to the era of the "Big Stick," "Dollar" and "Gunboat Diplomacy," Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in his March 1933 inaugural address that U.S. foreign policy would henceforth follow the policies of the 'good neighbor' and that it was opposed to armed intervention.⁷⁰

It is most interesting to note that this Good Neighbor policy was initiated in 1933, the same year that Adolf Hitler began perfecting his plans to conquer and enslave Germany's neighbors. The U.S. was supporting the principle of nonintervention in the affairs of its neighbors, respecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and even consulting (rather than acting) with these governments in times of crisis.⁷¹ Thus the enlightened U.S. political policy of the 1933-1939 period set a new tone and helped repair much damage resulting from earlier policies. In retrospect, this new approach served to prepare Latin America psychologically for joining the U.S. in meeting an external threat to this hemisphere.

Meanwhile in Nicaragua, Somoza was consolidating his power base by weeding out all those in the National Guard who professed anything short of one-hundred percent loyalty to him. As time passed, Somoza became strong enough to openly challenge President Sarcasa. Through a series of ingenious power plays, he slowly chipped away at Sarcasa's support to the point that Sarcasa, on June 4, 1936, "scampered off into exile."⁷² By the end of the 1937 Presidential elections, Somoza emerged as a clear victor. No President had ever taken office with so much power.

Over the next three years, "Tacho," as Somoza was called, continued to consolidate his power over Nicaragua. He was not the only strongman or dictator coming to the fore at this time in Latin America. Besides Nicaragua, there was the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Cuba, each of which were experiencing their own brand of dictatorship. They all preached internal reforms to assuage the internal left and stabilize the political situations in order to impress their primary benefactor the United States.⁷³

Timing or U.S. apathy or a combination of both seemed to support the emerging dictators. As the war drums beat louder in Europe, Roosevelt needed the assurance that there would be Latin American reciprocity to his Good Neighbor initiatives. By this, he meant a hemispheric contribution to the defense of the Americas.⁷⁴ Washington defense planners, in 1939, found themselves faced with a rather unsettling prospect. That prospect was not having enough U.S. troops to defend the continental U.S., let alone the entire Western Hemisphere. Such vital interests as the defense of the Panama Canal and protecting the vast natural resources so necessary to support a war required extra defense assistance which could only be found within Latin America itself. Anchoring the north bank of the Panama Canal was the strategically located nation of Nicaragua, which just happened to be under the firm hand of pro-U.S. strongman - Somoza.

Somoza was very adept at manipulating the Americans. He was no fool and clearly saw the security dilemma being faced by the U.S. He made it very clear that he would assist wherever possible. To prove this pledge, Washington's enemies automatically became his enemies, be they the Axis powers in the late 1930s and early 1940s or the Communists thereafter. In fact Somoza started his accumulation of wealth by the appropriation of all German-owned properties throughout Nicaragua. All of this was done under the pretext of anti-Nazism. This appropriation, coupled with other land grabbing methods, allowed him to become Nicaragua's largest private landowner by 1944.⁷⁵

Somoza's complete control of Nicaragua aided Roosevelt in another very interesting way. For example, other than being on the side of the U.S. during the war years, Somoza was able to prevent any hint of a popular uprising such as were being experienced in other parts of the hemisphere. In other words, Good Neighborism, for all its good intentions, was failing

to quell destabilizing outbursts of revolution. Not so in Nicaragua - at least not for another 40 years. As an interesting sidelight to this off-handed relationship between Roosevelt and Somoza, the following story was passed around Washington: Somoza was invited to Washington to visit personally with FDR. The President, while reviewing a State Department memo briefing him on Somoza, was reported to have said: "He's a SOB, but he's ours."⁷⁶

"Our SOB" was fairly well left to his own dictatorial devices as long as he maintained order in Nicaragua. The U.S., through sheer neglect, provided a considerable amount of political support to Somoza. As was the case in the mid to late 1800s, Nicaragua again seemed to take a backseat when it came to having qualified U.S. diplomats assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Managua. In fact, the U.S.'s ambassadorial representatives to Nicaragua "were usually individuals of very low professional qualifications who were easily co-opted and manipulated by the (Somoza) family."⁷⁷ These weak ambassadors, in many respects, served Somoza better than they did the U.S. They in essence acted more as agents and cronies of the Somozas than as envoys of the U.S.⁷⁸

During the Second World War, the U.S. constructed large airfields at Managua and at Puerto Cabezas (located near the Honduran border on the Caribbean coast) and built a deep water port at Corinto. These facilities are actively used today as major ports of entry for Cuban, Warsaw Pact, and Soviet ships and aircraft as they provide support to the Sandinista regime. Nicaragua has been the crossroads for many travelers. Returning to the 1940s, this early construction in Nicaragua was but a small part of the overall number of defense related military agreements signed with various Latin American nations. Nicaragua's only armed force, the National Guard,

was the recipient of large quantities of military equipment and arms during the war. Although they never engaged the Axis armed forces, they were provided enough war-fighting material to insure Somoza's personal army continued domination of the domestic political scene.⁷⁹

Using the war as an excuse, Somoza declared a state of seige which suspended all constitutional guarantees. With these guarantees suspended, he substituted his own self-serving rules. One of these was the barring of the opposition Conservative Party from holding any political meetings.⁸⁰ Finally, throughout the 1940s, as the war raged in Europe, Somoza continued to increase his personal wealth and to ingratiate himself with the U.S.

Somoza's dream of perpetual dominance took an unexpected turn when Harry Truman became President following Roosevelt's untimely death. The fiesty Truman and his Secretary of State, James T. Byrnes, decided there should be a change in U.S. policy towards Nicaragua. While saying they still supported the idea of non-intervention, the Department of State began seeking ways of blocking Somoza's reelection to President. Somoza was able to weather this storm thanks to two events: the outbreak of the Korean War, and Joseph McCarthy's communist witch-hunt in the U.S. With the Cold War blazing white hot in Korea and Europe and McCarthy vigorously shaking our national tree for communists, Somoza sighed with relief and beat his anti-communist drums all the louder.⁸¹

The dictatorial rule of Anastasio Somoza Garcia did, however, come to an end on September 21, 1956. A young poet named Rigoberto Lopez Perez was able to slip by Somoza's personal body guards and pumped five bullets into the dictator's obese frame. By personal orders from the President of the United States, Dwight David Eisenhower, Somoza was flown from Nicaragua to Panama via a U.S. Army helicopter so that he could be treated in the largest, best equipped and best staffed hospital in the region - Gorgas

U.S. Army Hospital in the Panama Canal Zone. Even with this excellent treatment, he died seven days later. If Lopez, who was subsequently shot and beaten to death on the party's dance floor, thought he had rid Nicaragua of this hated dictator, he was sadly mistaken. Somoza's sons, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Jr. - a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and Luis - a graduate of three American universities; Louisiana State (where he majored in agronomy), University of Maryland and the University of California, were in the wings ready to step into their father's shoes.⁸² According to Tacho, neither son had inherited his brain or his cunning. As will be seen, he obviously underrated both.

Within hours after the senior Somoza died, Luis, the eldest son, became Nicaragua's new President. Anastasio, Jr., sporting his 1946 West Point class ring, became the Commander of the National Guard. He immediately proceeded to conduct a nation wide terror campaign against known enemies of the Somoza family as a measure to avenge his father's death. In actuality, their father's murder provided the brothers the right sort of excuse for a drastic consolidation of their grip on the country. From 1956 until 1967, Luis effectively ruled the nation. During his first term of office, he announced that he would only serve one term. He did this by restoring those constitutional articles that prohibited immediate reelection or succession to the presidency by any relative of the incumbent. Thus through this maneuver, Luis succeeded in preventing his younger brother from becoming President. He was a manipulator and succeeded in getting two successive puppet presidents of his choosing into office.⁸³

He was, in many respects, as harsh a dictator as his father had been. Luis did, however, honestly try to restore economic stability to the nation. Agrarian reform programs were beginning to bear fruit and the

overall economy was improving. Also, a big shot in the arm to Nicaragua's economy was the period of increased foreign aid under the auspices of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Meanwhile, Anastasio (Tachito) remained patient throughout all these reforms and occupied his time by honing the military skills of "his" National Guard. He did this by sending a large number of his officers and enlisted men to be trained in the finer arts of war at a U.S. run school in the Panama Canal Zone. This school, known as the School of the Americas trained over the years, almost all of the officers of the Nicaraguan National Guard.

Interestingly enough, many officers that had been young soldiers under the tutelage of the U.S. Marines in the late 1920s and early 1930s, were not all that convinced of the effectiveness of the U.S.'s military methods. This was based on their having witnessed the U.S.'s inability to decisively win against Sandino. Several of these officers, in later years, would join the emerging new breed of leftist Sandinista guerrillas. Anastasio's mid-range objective was to rid Nicaragua of his older brother. While he was making preparations for this palace coup, Luis, in 1967, preempted Anastasio's plans by dying of a heart attack.⁸⁴

Before proceeding into the 1970s, the clock should be turned back to the year 1958, two years after Somoza was assassinated. That year became known as the year Latin America spat upon Vice-President Richard M. Nixon. His turbulent tour through South America would sour him on that part of the world permanently. This included not only those nations in South America, but all Spanish speaking nations (except Nicaragua as will be seen) from Texas' Rio Grande to the southern tip of Argentina. Even though Nixon's personal feelings came into direct conflict with President Eisenhower's and Secretary of State John F. Dulles' policy of "coddling dictators," he was not yet in a position to alter that policy.⁸⁵ Nixon was not alone in his

desire to rid the Latin nations of these dictators or power elites.

On January 8, 1959, Fidel Castro and his scruffy band of guerrillas emerged triumphant out of Cuba's Sierra Maestra Mountains and into the streets of Havana. On that date, dictator/strongman Fulgencio Batista's twenty-six year tyrannical reign came to an end. This event, some 600 miles east of Nicaragua's coast would have a profound impact not only on Nicaragua but the entire Western Hemisphere in the years ahead. Dictators Luis Somoza and Dominican Republic's Rafael Leonidas Trujillo aided Batista up to the very end with supplies of arms and ammunition. This support was not lost on Castro and his bearded gang. As a further endearment to Fidel, Trujillo and Luis Somoza were the first to grasp the situation and accuse the Cuban revolutionaries of being Communists. Evidently Luis had learned something from his father, i.e. it did seem that he had inherited his father's "anti-communist drum."

Castro's victory had a dramatic ripple effect throughout the region. The Cubans came to believe that their unique experience could be duplicated elsewhere in Latin America. Further, they had the crusader zeal to prove that it was exportable. After all, these dictators in Latin America that had been protected and supported by U.S. Presidents and their Secretaries of State since before World War II, were now apparently ripe to be overthrown.⁸⁶

The first attempt against Nicaragua came from within on May 30, 1959 when 112 guerrillas ambushed a National Guard unit. Unlike the situation in Cuba, Nicaragua's National Guard was well trained by a very adroit commander - Tachito. He had learned his lessons well while at West Point. With that knowledge, he carefully studied the revolutionary tactics used by the Cuban guerrillas. Anastasio also had profited greatly by the mistakes

that Batista had made. He demonstrated a great deal of acute awareness of the power of foreign public opinion when he invited the foreign press to accompany his troops as they went after the guerrilla force. This time the poorly led guerrillas were no match for the National Guard and were soundly defeated. Tachito's officers performed flawlessly due in part to training received at the School of the Americas. Additionally there were several others, like their leader, who were graduates of West Point, and others had been sent to France to train at St. Cyr.⁸⁷ While the National Guard was in the field chasing guerrillas with the world press looking on, Luis took the opportunity to publicly charge Cubans with complicity to overthrow him.⁸⁸

But it wasn't Castro that was planning an invasion, it was the United States under Eisenhower. The CIA had recruited approximately 1,400 Cuban exiles and had slowly assembled them in secret training camps located in Nicaragua and Guatemala. Is it any wonder, based on this historical evidence, that the current Sandinista regime accused the CIA of instigating the Contra/Anti-Sandinista activities long before the U.S. publicly admitted it? We may have a short memory but they apparently do not.⁸⁹

The CIA's invasion plan, approved by the Pentagon, was inherited by John F. Kennedy when he took office in 1961. Without receiving the full details he gave his blessing to the operation. This permitted the CIA instructors and planners to continue to train the invasion force for an early spring assault on Cuba. It was from Nicaragua's Puerto Cabezas that the force was finally assembled for the final deployment to Cuba. The rest of the "Bay of Pigs" saga is well known and goes beyond the scope of this monograph.

The question is what were the consequences of the ill fated operation as it related to Nicaragua? In an indirect way, it had a profound effect on Nicaragua. The Bay of Pigs taught the inexperienced President a bitter

lesson. From it he developed a profound distrust of the foreign policy bureaucracy and was highly distressed over the nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's involvement. The JCS had deferred crucial decisions to the CIA and proposed few alternatives to the plan which was ill conceived from the very beginning. All in all if the CIA had actually bungled the mission with Pentagon acquiescence, the Department of State was equally culpable.⁹⁰ The Bay of Pigs served as a catalyst for the reorganization of all competing and conflicting agencies involved in foreign affairs, i.e., State Department, CIA, DoD, etc. Worst of all, the ill fated invasion tarnished the international image of the U.S., necessitated a new approach to Latin American radicalism, and was, as some felt, probably the greatest single factor that contributed to the October 1962 missile crisis.

As noted, Nicaragua had a minor but important part in the Bay of Pigs pre-invasion plans. The U.S., probably through this off-handed involvement, came to realize that para-military techniques of counter-insurgency and guerrilla warfare constituted a solution to counter communist threats. President Kennedy decided to shift the anti-Communist campaign away from collective defense as proposed by Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy and move more toward internal security. Thus the Latin American military, such as the very pro U.S. Nicaraguan National Guard, the entrepreneurs of violence in the 1950s and 1960s, now stood as the sole stabilizing force in the Central America area.⁹¹

The best way to help this bastion against the Communist threat was through increased U.S. military assistance programs (MAP). This program had several objectives. One was the desire to maintain good relations with these Latin American armies if for nothing else than for short term political reasons. Another was to coordinate military doctrine, planning,

equipment and training in the event that joint operations became necessary. By 1963, an annual MAP grant of 1.6 million dollars was made available to Nicaragua's National Guard.⁹² Thus with MAP and Kennedy's economic-based programs associated with the Alliance for Progress, the Somoza dictatorship in the 1960's was at its zenith in strength.

The Somoza success formula was very simple. It involved maintaining the all important support of the National Guard, continuing to manipulate the Americans, and ameliorating the important domestic power contenders. Loyalty to Somoza was a prerequisite to be in the upper ranks of the National Guard. Military privilege and kickbacks from 'dirty business' became a way of life. Encouraging guardsmen of all ranks to be corrupt served to psychologically isolate them from the people, thus making them even more dependent on the Somoza family.⁹³

As for manipulating the Americans, the Somozas were past masters. All three Somozas - Anastasio I (Tacho), Luis, and Anastasio II (Tachito), and a fourth, their heir apparent, Anastasio III (Tachito's eldest son), were educated in the U.S. and spoke fluent English. Over the years, the Somozas acquired powerful friends in the U.S. Congress. This was done by providing large campaign contributions to their congressional friends and by advocating a strong anti-communist stance in the interest of hemispheric stability.⁹⁴ This support was also well established in the U.S. Executive Branch. As previously noted, Roosevelt supported Somoza (our "S.O.B.") all through his multiple terms of office. Richard Millett writes another President's feelings: "Nixon remembered that Nicaragua was one Latin American country which had not greeted him with hostile demonstrations during his 1958 tour of Latin America and he considered Somoza a firm ally, deserving all possible support."⁹⁵

To round out the Somoza trilogy of success, the importance of domestic

power contenders was a factor as well. The Somozas normally appeased these important domestic groups by allowing them ample opportunities to enrich themselves. The formula for this was simple. They permitted these contenders freedom of organization and expression so long as they did not become overly greedy or, more importantly, did not abuse their privilege by seriously challenging the system that gave the Somozas a stranglehold on Nicaragua.⁹⁶

The assassination of John F. Kennedy in November 1963 marked a subtle turning point in inter-American relations. Taking his cue from Eisenhower, President Kennedy had taken to heart the idea of America's special responsibility to the people of this hemisphere. However, the framework was slow to develop. The Kennedy Administration had started a study in 1963 that envisioned a modernization of the Monroe Doctrine. The study's objective was to declare an incompatibility with Communist penetration in Latin America. Unfortunately, the study was not an indepth one and revealed only half truths. There was enough substance, however, for Lyndon B. Johnson to turn the results into a half-baked policy subsequently called the Johnson Corollary. As can be imagined, it did not have teeth and almost with its inception it died a natural death.

The reason this initiative is mentioned is that it was indicative of things to come. Following Kennedy's assassination, Latin America moved imperceptibly away from the United States. Nations, such as Nicaragua under the iron-fisted control of a dictator like Somoza, developed their own inter-regional identity exclusive of the U.S. Presidents Johnson and Nixon, both naive about the Central American situation and deeply involved with the Vietnam War, paid little attention to Latin American events. Their main concern was to prevent another Cuba. This caused them to turn

steadily more to the right. The result of this fear of another Cuba(s), post-Kennedy Presidents (Johnson, Nixon, and Ford) leaned heavily on the capabilities of military organizations such as Nicaragua's U.S. trained and equipped National Guard to maintain internal stability. It almost seems that history was repeating itself from the days of the Second World War. Since these Presidents leaned so heavily on the abilities of these military organizations, they, by necessity, had to ignore the repressive methods used by these dictators and their military arms to maintain internal stability. An old adage fits very appropriately here - "Out of sight, out of mind."⁹⁷

Thus in the Caribbean Basin and in Central America, the U.S.'s political-military strategy of anti-Communism, unfortunately, left our nation with no alternatives save the perpetuation of these highly repressive regimes. In theory, it was hoped that these pro-U.S./dictator led countries would guarantee hemispheric stability over the long haul.⁹⁸

SANDINISTAS - EARTHQUAKE - HUMAN RIGHTS — 1972-1979

Despite the massacre of some 25,000 Nicaraguans during the Somoza's long reign, Washington continued to prop up the Somoza dictatorship with military and economic aid. As previously noted, the Somoza family through the 1960s and 1970s regularly cried wolf at Congressional aid hearings falsely claiming that money was needed to fight a planned Castro-financed guerrilla invasion. There were periodic upheavals by pseudo guerrilla forces but there is no evidence that they ever posed a serious threat to the government.

What guerrilla organization there was developed under the auspices of the loosely organized "Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional" (FSLN) or, in English, the Sandinista National Liberation Front. The Sandinista name

was taken from that legendary guerrilla hero, Augusto C. Sandino, who fought against the the U.S. Marines and was assassinated in 1933 by the first Somoza. The FSLN even used the same red and black colors adopted by Sandino's guerrillas in their fight against the U.S. Marines in the 1920s and early 1930s. The FSLN of the 1960s was led by Carlos Fonseca Amador and drew more moral inspiration during this time than it did material support from the Castro Revolution. The FSLN was officially founded in 1962 as an anti-imperialist, revolutionary organization dedicated to overthrowing Somoza. The FSLN had only limited popular support and posted no significant military victories during the first five years of its existence.⁹⁹ In fact, the possibility of it being a serious threat to the National Guard seemed ludicrous at the time. As late as 1974 the FSLN had fewer than one hundred members.¹⁰⁰

However, the revolutionary embryo was there waiting for a event that would stir it to life. That event came a little after midnight on December 23, 1972 when the center of Managua was torn apart by a massive earthquake. Up to 20,000 died, 75% of the city's housing and 90% of the commercial capacity were destroyed beyond repair.¹⁰¹ In the following forty-eight hours, anarchy was king. Looting broke out almost immediately and the biggest violators were the National Guard themselves. By the third day, some semblance of order was reinstigated by Somoza.¹⁰²

President Nixon ordered an all-out U.S. assistance effort to aid Nicaragua. Little did Nixon realize that as the relief supplies poured into Nicaragua, they would be appropriated by the National Guard and funneled into their very well organized black market enterprises. Because Somoza had encouraged this form of corruption, he was hard pressed to stop it and he didn't. The U.S. should have gotten the hint of Somoza's true nature

during this Nicaraguan crisis. If Somoza had been the concerned statesmen he had led so many Americans to think he was, he would have demonstrated his patriotism by using part of his family's fortune (conservatively set at 300 million dollars at the time) to help his country and his countrymen. This was not the case nor his desire. Rather, he chose instead to turn a national disaster into a personal gain.¹⁰³

It is recorded that Somoza "described the earthquake as a revolution of possibilities."¹⁰⁴ While allowing his National Guard to plunder the people and the city, he and his associates used their control of the government to channel huge amounts of international relief funds into their own pockets. Somoza personally cornered the reconstruction market in Managua. Rather than move to a new location to rebuild the capital city, he decided to rebuild Managua on the same earthquake-prone site. After all, he did own extensive holdings in this urban area and its reconstruction would garner huge profits.¹⁰⁵ It was at this point that open expressions of popular discontent with the regime began to bubble to the surface.

Richard Millett noted that "many traditional sources of Guardia graft" were eliminated by the earthquake.¹⁰⁶ In their rapaciousness to get all that back plus some, their true nature was revealed. Additionally, adverse publicity resulting from the post-earthquake corruption further damaged Somoza's prestige worldwide.¹⁰⁷ Within Nicaragua, the people had had enough of Somoza as well.

As history has repeatedly shown, there comes a time, even for the most efficient dictatorships, when the people rebel. In Nicaragua the revolution was nurtured by the earthquake. Its first real impact occurred in December 1974 following a successful guerrilla operation where the FSLN was able to capture and hold hostage a group of elite partygoers until the government met a series of guerrilla demands. These included the payment of

a large ransom, the publication and broadcast over a national radio station of a lengthy communique, and the release of fourteen imprisoned FSLN members. Also included in this package was a free trip to Cuba. Enraged by this affront to his power, Somoza imposed martial law and sent his National Guard into the countryside to root out the FSLN instigators. The Guardsmen went on a rampage of torture, rape, and roadside executions of hundreds of peasants.¹⁰⁸ Somoza's flagrant disregard for human rights earned him considerable (and well deserved) notoriety.

The last straw came on January 10, 1978 when Somoza supposedly ordered the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, a very popular Managua newspaper publisher and the only opposition leader with a broad-based following. Chamorro's death brought it all together and the Somoza government downfall was but a short year and a half away. His death sparked a massive outbreak of popular hostility toward Somoza and his hated National Guard. This hostility took the form of multiple demonstrations. Many of these demonstrations became acts of violence against the National Guard and government officials. Fidel Castro, surprisingly enough, had no hand in this initial outpouring of revolutionary violence or the following successes achieved by the guerrillas; it was entirely a popular reaction to the cumulative doings of the U.S. supported Somozas.¹⁰⁹

While Castro was not initially involved, changes in U.S. politics paradoxically contributed to Somoza's future downfall. These changes can be traced back to 1977. Jimmy Carter was sworn in as President that same year and his administration immediately began pressuring Somoza to reduce his reported violations of human rights. Somoza much as his father before him, found himself caught in the middle, trying to appease the Americans and conducting business as usual in Nicaragua. He grudgingly complied with the

U.S. request which many feel cost him his country a year and a half later. Carter, in retrospect, clearly didn't have in mind for the Sandinista's to kick old friend Somoza out. He just wanted to teach one of the U.S.'s "good old boys" a small lesson. If one considers Nicaragua as a major test case for Carter's "Human Rights" policy, then there was a definite disconnect in objectives.¹¹⁰

In April 1977, the U.S. followed up the human rights warning with a restriction of both military and economic aid to Nicaragua. However, Somoza called in all his chips with his Congressional friends and lobbyists and through their efforts this restriction was relaxed. Somoza, following the Chamorro assassination, knew he had finally overplayed his hand. At the same time, however, the U.S. was on the "horns of a dilemma" and Somoza knew it. Carter, throughout his Presidency, had no viable alternatives for dealing with Nicaragua. Somoza, knowing this better than anyone, realized that the U.S. would have to either support him or the Sandinistas. However, he was only partially right in believing the U.S. would support him one hundred percent.¹¹¹

The U.S. continued to waffle on making a firm decision on what to do. This was based on a Washington intelligence community's assessment of the National Guard's capability to deal with the FSLN guerrilla force. They felt that the Guard was capable through sheer firepower alone of repelling and defeating any FSLN offensive. Their assessment proved disastrously wrong. Three weeks after the final phase of the FSLN offensive was set in motion, the Sandinista rebels had complete control of Nicaragua. On July 17, 1979, President Anastasio Somoza Debayle, with the assistance of the U.S. Embassy in Managua, fled to Miami and into exile. The once powerful National Guard ceased to exist as an entity twenty-four hours later. Thus the U.S. was faced with its first revolutionary guerrilla triumph in this

hemisphere since Fidel Castro's victory twenty years earlier in Cuba.¹¹² The question that needs to be asked is how could U.S. policy have failed so miserably? A better question might be: "What 'bandaid' fell off first?" The following analysis hopefully will provide some of the answers.

REBELS WIN - CONTRAS - CARIBBEAN INITIATIVE — 1979-1984

As events started to unfold in Nicaragua, the U.S. consistently tried to fit a square peg of policy into the round hole of reality. After the assassination of Chamorro in January 1978, President Carter remained at the margin or on the sidelines of the conflict. Rather than entering the game with the winning play, he treated the whole Chamorro affair as a human rights case when in fact it had all the aspects of being a premeditated murder committed at the highest level. As Nicaraguans prepared for the bloodbath to follow, the Carter administration went on using "half-baked" inducements and sanctions, believed to have been based on intelligence assessments, to moderate Somoza's behavior.

Carter's human rights message was probably clear from his perspective but it was very confusing to the Nicaraguans. Because he was treating Chamorro's death as a human rights issue, Carter elicited widespread criticism from the Nicaraguan opposition (moderates and a growing number of Sandinistas), and from numerous countries within and without Latin America who believed that the U.S. should adopt a clear position against Somoza. Many historians and political analysts consider the Carter inactivity during this period as a crucial failure in U.S. policy.¹¹³ This point will be brought out in some detail later.

Mentioned above was a "Nicaraguan opposition" which was composed of moderates and Sandinistas. To suggest that they were of one accord would

be misleading because the situation was very complex. In fact, there were enormous differences between the groups as to how to solve the problem. The one common problem faced by both groups, however, was Somoza. The guerrillas were advocating socialism and the abolition of private enterprise. The industrialists and large landowners (remember Somoza's domestic power contenders - this is the same group) insisted that business continue as usual but without Somoza. Interestingly enough, there were Nicaraguans in both camps who sincerely believed that these differences could be resolved by recommending the following: 1) do not nationalize the private sector, but 2) expropriate the Somoza family's sizeable holdings, i.e., their landholdings in Nicaragua alone exceeded 5 million acres plus the numerous industrial interests could all be for the taking. The income from these resources would more than adequately finance the sweeping social and land reform programs envisioned. Finally, 3) the National Guard would be reorganized to become an army of the people not against them.¹¹⁴

Carter, fully cognizant of the coalition's proposals, rejected them out of hand which effectively closed the door to an excellent opportunity for meaningful dialogue. Instead, he continued to cast the U.S.'s lot with its long time friend and "good old boy" - Somoza. With that door closed, the only recourse left for the rebels was through armed conflict. If the Washington intelligence community had had their fingers on the pulse of Nicaragua, there were sufficient indicators available to signal trouble. The excellently trained and equipped National Guard was fast losing its "cutting edge." Morale was extremely low throughout the ranks mainly because of the very real mauling they were taking from the Sandinista guerrillas. Another reason can be attributed to Somoza's crackdown on key National Guard and police commanders who where implicated in a plot to overthrow him. The plot involved over two hundred National Guardsmen and

was the first such mutiny attempt since the one that almost occurred shortly after Somoza I's assassination. Finally, the general populace, with the growing power of the guerrillas behind them, were becoming less and less intimidated by the Guard. This had a subsequent effect on the National Guard's investigations into guerrilla activities, i.e., the populace was more willing to suffer the wrath of the National Guard rather than betray the guerrillas.¹¹⁵

Clearly, to all except U.S. policymakers, the overthrow of Somoza was just a matter of time. Carter's reluctance to disengage the U.S. completely from Somoza only reinforced the FSLN's determination. The Sandinistas, with the specter of the original Sandino fighting the American imperialists in the 1920s and 30s looming large in the background, saw clearly the objective before them. They seized the initiative by staging a spectacularly successful takeover of the National Legislative Palace in August 1978. From this the rebels were again able to humiliate Somoza by extracting from him a series of concessions. Somoza retaliated by destroying large sections of cities openly sympathetic to the Sandinista cause. This destruction resulted in extremely high civilian casualties and heavy property damage.¹¹⁶ This solidified the rebels resolve even more and during the next eight months they began making their preparations for the final offensive. This preparation was assisted by a large influx of money, arms, ammunition, and equipment from a wide variety of sympathetic countries within and without the region. This allowed the Sandinistas to eventually overpower the National Guard. Somoza with assistance from the U.S. Embassy in Managua, fled to Miami on July 17, 1979. On July 20, the provisional government rode victorious through the cheering crowds that lined the streets of Managua.¹¹⁷

Up to this point, Cuba's involvement has only been mentioned in passing. One must remember that supporting revolutionary groups in Latin America has always been and continues to be one of the primary goals of the Cuban Revolution. But deeper than this is the Soviet connection. Recognizing the importance of Western Hemispheric solidarity to the U.S., the Soviets were then and still are prepared to take advantage of every opportunity to embarrass the United States. To the Soviets, Cuba provides an excellent, even a low-cost vehicle to harass the United States on its exposed southern flank. However, an important point to remember is that the Soviets are aiding revolutionary movements, but they are not creating such movements. It is the Castro's of this world that do that for them. Castro, besides his revolutionary zeal, had a personal reason to unseat the Somozas. Recall his festering animosity toward them because of their permitting the use of Puerto Cabezas as a staging area/launch site for the Bay of Pigs invasion.¹¹⁸

The strategy adopted by the Nicaraguan revolutionaries required that Cuba redefine its traditional role, tailoring its policies to match FSLN strategy which had developed out of the complexities peculiar to Nicaragua's internal conditions. Castro had learned his lesson well from his Bolivian experience where he lost his key captain, Che Guevara, and the Bolivian Revolution as well. In other words, he would accommodate rather than impose. The U.S., with its intransient attitude to continue support to Somoza, was assisting Castro immeasurably as he surely knew it would. After all he had traveled down that same road before in the 1950s in Cuba. Meanwhile Cuba was cleverly concealing their economic and military support to the Sandinistas by masking it with support being provided by other countries such as Panama, Costa Rica and Venezuela.¹¹⁹

In retrospect, the Nicaraguan conflict before January 1979 could be

characterized as an anti-dictatorial struggle by an outraged populace. Beginning in January 1979 to the final takeover in July that same year, the conflict became more polarized and increasingly militarized. The FSLN, during this period, became more radicalized as Marxist-Leninist leadership gained control. This was evidenced by their embracing the likes of Qadaffi and Arafat and of course their fawning obeisance to the Cubans, Soviets and the Bulgarians. In other words, without U.S. assistance, those that sought a more peaceable/moderate approach were, with each passing day, being shoved aside in order to make room for the more radical elements who had a sympathetic ear in Cuba. If one wonders how the revolution became a full blown socialist revolution with Cuba's finger prints all over it, one need only review these facts.¹²⁰

The broad based coalition that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship began to unravel almost immediately after the FSLN came to power. Carter, still unable to see the handwriting on the wall, hoped to the very end of his term in office that the FSLN would be swamped by moderates once Somoza was gone.¹²¹ The year 1981 became a pivotal year because it brought about two significant events - one directly related to the other. First, President Ronald Reagan and his Administration came to office in January. They came with a determination to reverse what they saw as the enormous damage that had been done to the U.S.'s national security by President Carter's foreign policy. One way of doing this was Reagan's willingness to very discretely undertake covert operations in Central America and sanctioning unconventional war. To this end, the CIA's covert operations branch was expanded. Second, after January 1981, the revolution entered its most radical phase, allegedly responding to the aforementioned "U.S. aggression." That "aggression" could be translated as Reagan's reversal of

Theodore Roosevelt's maxim for dealing with the region with "speak softly and carry a big stick" to Reagan's "talk harshly and carry a little stick."¹²²

This U.S. policy, if it can be called as such, provided the FSLN leadership the necessary ammunition to legitimize the buildup of their newly created 25,000-man armed force. With this buildup (plus an additional 50,000-man reserve force), the FSLN, in effect, created a Somoza type National Guard of their own. The only major difference in the two organizations was size. The FSLN forces were more than three times that of Somoza's.¹²³ This force immediately set about to eliminate all moderate opposition. This turn of events, created by a number of factors not least of which was of U.S. origin, was well summed up by Alan Riding, a Mexico Bureau Chief for the New York Times. He reinforced this writer's "bandaid diplomacy" thesis by writing the following: "Central America has gone from being an ulcer that a new U.S. Administration (Reagan's) thought it could lance and heal in a matter of months to a running sore that will plague the United States for some years to come."¹²⁴ The above statement could conceivably be a summary statement for every new Presidential Administration coming to office since 1823.

Seeing the error of his ways, President Reagan started to add teeth to his stand against the Cuban/Soviet influenced Nicaraguan government. With some assurance of assistance from Congress, he began increasing support to El Salvador and Honduras. Reagan approved large scale military maneuvers along Nicaragua's borders as a show of U.S. resolve to support those Central American countries friendly to the U.S. such as Honduras. He approved covert aid to be used to arm and equip the approximately 12,000 anti-Sandinistas or Contras who were starting to organize themselves in order to take the fight back to the Sandinistas. These elements also can be

identified under various other names such as the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE). 125

Responding to reports of increased attacks in Nicaragua staged by Contra guerrillas, the 98th Congress began a series of debates on limiting American assistance. A number of concerned Congressmen centered their attention and fears on the possibility that U.S. involvement with Nicaraguan exiles might eventually lead to active U.S. military involvement in Central America. This represented a subtle but dramatic shift from the previous Congressional sessions where, of all things, the center of the debate revolved around whether or not the U.S. should provide aid to the Sandinista government in order to moderate its leftist revolution. It would seem that this issue should have been before Congress in 1978 rather than at this juncture. Unfortunately, this only tends to reinforce the seemingly infinite capacity of the U.S. Congress, at least where Latin America is concerned, to misread and mismanage crucial situations it has before it.

President Reagan, in a message to Congress on March 17, 1982, transmitted his proposed economic plan for the Caribbean Basin. During the Address, he said that the economic, political and security challenges in the Caribbean Basin are formidable. Besides the need to develop economically, they need the means to defend themselves against attempts by externally-supported Communist groups. President Reagan, in no uncertain terms, made it clear that the crisis cannot be ignored. The entire well being and security of the region is in our own vital interests.

The very idea of increasing trade, tax credits, economic and military aid to selected nations in Central America sparked numerous heated debates. In March 1983, Congress questioned whether CIA covert aid/assistance was

legally within the realm of U.S. treaty agreements with the Organization of American States (OAS), and even the United Nation's Charter. Others believed that the Reagan administration should have complete freedom to pursue whatever course considered necessary.¹²⁶

House Resolution (H.R.) 2760 was introduced by Rep. Edward P. Boland, D-Mass., to amend the Fiscal Year 1983 Intelligence Authorization Act to "prohibit U.S. support for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and to authorize overt assistance to other Central American governments to interdict military equipment shipped from Nicaragua and Cuba to individuals, groups, organizations, or movements seeking to overthrow Central American governments."¹²⁷ The House passed this resolution on July 28, 1983 by a vote of 228 to 195. Passage by the Senate did not expect to have any immediate effect on U.S. covert aid going to Nicaraguan rebels.

While the debate continues, President Reagan began increasing U.S. presence in Central America in three very dramatic ways: First, he sent a naval task force to patrol the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Central America; second, joint U.S./Honduran military operations were given added emphasis and third, the invasion of the island nation of Grenada has had a profound effect on the entire region. With that most successful venture, President Reagan was doing much more than "talking harshly and carrying a little stick." He was now "talking harshly" and backing it up with a "big stick." The Sandinista government understood the significance of this more than anyone else because they feared that they might be next. With more than 5,000 American troops on the ground in Honduras for Operation Big Pine II (August 1983 - February 1984), and the CIA-supported Contra forces operating literally in the shadow of Managua, the Nicaraguan government, from their perspective, appears to have a legitimate concern.¹²⁸

This feeling of concern or apprehension is probably a reflection of

Cuba's uneasiness. On New Year's Eve (December 31, 1983), Cubans began celebrating the 25th anniversary of their revolutionary movement in Cuba. However, from all reports, this annual celebration has not been all that joyful as compared to years past. This celebration was highlighted with an undercurrent of anxiety. Why? Do the Cubans sense that their revolution is more imperiled today than at anytime since the era of the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis some twenty years ago? The answer certainly has many facets. For one, the Reagan Administration is definitely on the move in the Caribbean Basin and in Central America, with the intent of rolling back Cuba's influence. As of this writing, Nicaragua, being a part of the Cuban/Soviet sphere of influence, indeed has valid reasons for concern.¹²⁹

CONCLUSION

The Honorable Richard Stone, President Reagan's special U.S. Ambassador to Central America, recently summarized the situation by saying the following: "The situation in Central America is very delicate, very difficult and very risky."¹³⁰ Ambassador Stone's assessment was diplomatic if not overly kind. Actually, Central America is a region "of" and "in" turmoil. This turmoil has been in the making for a number of years and the U.S. can, in large part, be held more than just passingly responsible for the present chaotic situation. Over these many years America has paid far too little attention to Central America and by extension, all of Latin America.

Central America, with Nicaragua as the hub, has been the recipient of U.S. attention and inattention since the early 1800s. During the disastrous Sandino affair of the 1920s and early 1930s, we saw for the first time in Latin America, a determined people employ something radically

new in warfare - it was later given the name of unconventional warfare. This new method of fighting and the U.S.'s growing frustration with the whole Nicaraguan situation caused the U.S. to leave the field of battle without a clear military victory. Unfortunately, we would witness a similar withdrawal only on a grander scale and under almost duplicate conditions in Vietnam.

In order to bring stability to Central America in the 1930s, we tried a new foreign policy initiative. Our government in 1934, warmly embraced a Nicaraguan of questionable character named Somoza. What Somoza became is a matter of historical record. Say what one might about him, he was, with a considerable amount of financial support from the U.S., able to bring stability to Nicaragua where we had failed in two arenas - in the field of diplomacy and in the realm of military support. Somoza was not the only dictator we were supporting. There were Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and Fulgencio Batista in Cuba who, one could argue, were also being justified by our overall foreign policy initiatives for the region. These dictators provided unquestioning (and unquestioned) support to the U.S. for more than four decades.

With the advent of the WW II, through the Cold War, and into Vietnam, the U.S. had its southern flank anchored by Nicaragua. This permitted the U.S. to focus its full attention elsewhere in this increasingly troubled world. Seemingly to our advantage, Central America's economies were performing without serious problems, that is unless one looked closely and very few did. In Nicaragua for example, Nicaraguans exploited and tyrannized each other for many decades, but to present day Sandinistas, the ultimate blame for the country's underdevelopment belongs to implemented policies of a long string of U.S. Presidents and their Secretaries of State. If a problem did attract our attention, we would "quick fix" it with

what this writer calls "bandaid diplomacy." This style of diplomacy and policymaking was less time consuming and offered a more expedient method to handle our southern neighbors.

As a result of sheer benign neglect, the U.S. faces a tremendous challenge today in Central America and once again Nicaragua is at the center of this challenge. Important U.S. national security interests are at stake in a campaign that is neither well understood nor, even worse, appreciated by the American public. This lack of understanding is again of our own making. Historically, events in Latin America have all too often commanded back page news. History books used in the U.S. education process, as far as I can recall, mentioned only in passing our involvement in Central America and then primarily to stress our role in construction of the Panama Canal. Our national interests and our principal foreign policy thrusts have been everywhere in the world except on the southern half of this hemisphere. We are in the process of paying for this neglect.

Central America and the Caribbean island nations have always been recognized as the strategic southern flank of the United States. Beginning with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the U.S. recognized the region as being important to our national security. Today's instability in Central America has caused us as a nation to recall this longstanding concern. President Reagan responded to the Communist threat in the Caribbean by ordering U.S. Army Rangers and U.S. Marines into Grenada. Additionally, he increased our military presence in El Salvador and Honduras as further proof of his concern toward the region. These actions directly relate to our national perception and interpretation of security interests in the most traditional terms of the east-west conflict - the principal focus of U.S. security and policy interests.

This monograph clearly reveals that the U.S. has not done all that well in Nicaragua and our mistakes are deeply etched in Nicaraguan and other Latin American nations' memories. To keep it there, the story of U.S. intervention has been and continues to be taught to everyone in Nicaragua from school room lectures to themes for theatrical productions. Dramatic swings in our policy of "bandaid diplomacy" towards the entire region, to include South America, have created uncertainty, skepticism and instability. Instability, in itself, challenges the cherished U.S. security assumption that political stability and strongly pro-American governments in the region are essential for U.S. security and well being. As long as the U.S.'s interpretation of its own security depends on this conventional wisdom, Nicaragua, with its heavy Cuban/Soviet influence, will continue to be a gnawing problem for U.S. policymakers.

Whatever end policy this Administration finally settles upon, the U.S. must, at all costs, reassert its preeminence in the region be it through economic initiatives or through the use of our military power or through a combination of both. The object is to reestablish stability which should insure security for our very much exposed southern flank. As we enter 1984, obtaining this stability seems to place high on President Reagan's list of national priorities. One thing we can all look forward to in this coming year is that Central America will become a principal foreign policy issue. It will surely be raised by political candidates who are vying for the Presidency as the election year starts heating up. Remember, President Hoover lost his bid for a second term due in part to the chaotic situation in Central America and his seeming inability to resolve the problem.

PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE

At first glance it appears that neither the President, the Department of State, nor the Department of Defense, in this writer's opinion, thought through any historical perspectives in formulating policies to solve today's situation in Central America. The threat of armed intervention or even armed intervention has never been a problem solving "cure all" for Central America. History is replete with examples of why this method has failed. If President Reagan continues to press the armed intervention aspect of his foreign policy, he is going to resurrect the ghost of Sandino even more out of the ashes of Nicaraguan history. If that happens, we will once again have to face most formibile nationalist forces. There is evidence that the Sandinistas are already preparing for a possible military failure by hiding stores of weapons, ammunition and fuel at clandestine depots around the country. This should clearly indicate that an allied victory would be followed by a protracted occupation marked by intense guerrilla warfare and subsequent heavy U.S. and allied casualties. We, as a nation, cannot out of hand ignore the historical roots of these Central American nations - certainly not the key nation of Nicaragua. Further, we are an excellent focus for nationalist rhetoric because our reputation as being the "big bully" from the north is well documented in every history book in Latin America.

I feel that in trying to solve the Nicaraguan problem, we, in the process, are going to create an even bigger problem in Honduras. If we continue to lean toward making a strongman army under General Gustavo Alvarez, we may well tilt the balance of political power within Honduras. It was only two years ago that Honduras, through a democratic election, successfully placed in office a civilian President named Roberto Suazo

Cordova. This was a dramatic departure from the previous years of military rule. Even though Suazo is the duly elected President of Honduras, General Alvarez seems to have the mantle of power. This power is directly proportional to growing U.S. interest in him and his armed forces. Let us not be so quick to forget a similiar situation with Somoza and the Nicaraguan National Guard in the mid-1930s. This increased military power and accompanying status is starting to have a disruptive effect on the civilian government's decision making process.

The U.S. justifies this military buildup as a necessary step to protect Honduras from Nicaraguan attack. But does Honduras consider Nicaragua as their number one regional enemy? Here the answer is not so clear. Ask a Honduran and he will tell you that El Salvador is Honduras' number one enemy. The truth of the matter is that Honduras fears an armed and unfriendly El Salvador as a potentially bigger threat than that posed by Nicaragua. This hostility/fear of El Salvador has its origins in the bloody "Soccer War" fought between these two countries a number of years ago. General Alvarez, a very professional and cunning military officer, continues to take advantage of this wind-fall of U.S. arms, equipment, training and money to harden his forces.

Unquestionably, Nicaragua poses a regional threat to all non-Communist nations and there is growing tension between Nicaragua and Honduras and border incidents proliferate. However, as noted, there is no historical hostility between Honduras and Nicaragua. Honduras is simply playing out its historical role. That role is one of providing a base of operations for guerrilla organizations. Sandino, in the 1920s and early 1930s, drew heavily on Honduran support and sanctuaries as he fought the U.S. Marines to a virtual standstill. The Sandinistas, in the 1960s ad 1970s, freely used Honduras as a convenient base of operations as they set about

eliminating Somoza and his National Guard. Now, in the 1980s, the Contras or anti-Sandinistas are staging their operations out of Honduras. One might conclude that Honduras is simply providing a traditional regional service.

To solve the Central American problem, we need to do something that does not necessarily involve a military solution. The alternative is to accept the Sandinistas government as a full-fledged member of the hemispheric family. The Marxist ideology that guides the Sandinistas is completely foreign to Nicaraguan needs. The Nicaraguans want the revolution to be saved, but the Soviet/Cuban brand of ideological fanaticism that has taken hold is creating social, political and economic chaos. We further know that decades of economic problems, not external subversion, are the major contributors to the present regional unrest. Nicaragua's problem has always been one of economic instability and the Marxist ideology feeds on it. We need to solve that problem and I recommend the following as a possible solution - besides the proposed Kissinger Commission economic package, or even in conjunction with it, we should offer to help finance and build a Nicaraguan ocean-to-ocean sea level canal. This has always been a cherished dream of the Nicaraguans. Recall that President McKinley, in the late 1800s, strongly recommended that the Nicaraguan site be chosen. Politics and his assassination intervened and his very valid proposal was subsequently rejected.

A Nicaraguan canal would offer untold advantages not only to Nicaragua but to the entire region. It would certainly bring life back into a faltering economy, but more importantly it would restore national pride that has so long been denied and for which we are held to blame. The U.S.'s role would be that of a working partner in the project which would show

more than just our passing concern in the economic health of the region. Rather than broadcasting our intentions through a barrel of a gun as we are doing now, we would be blunting the communist's primary source of strength presently in force against the region.

There is no question that a second canal through Central America is needed. The Panama Canal, since our relinquishing control to the Panamanian government with the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty by President Carter, has steadily fallen into a state of disrepair. This is aggravated even more by the sheer age of the 70 year old canal. A canal through Nicaragua would be a more practical sea level canal which in itself would offer multiple advantages. For one, it would be built to accomodate today's modern ships and international shipping needs.

As a Latin American historian and an U.S. Army Area Specialist for Latin America, I feel that the above course of action is feasible. It is historically sound. Finally, I hope this study project will serve to "inform" all those who have been "misinformed" about our past involvement in Central America, particularly Nicaragua, and how this past involvement relates to the present situation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Is The Good Neighbor Policy A Success? War Department EM 14, GI Round Table (Washington: The American Historical Association, 1945), p. 5.
2. "U.S. Central American Policy: Pro & Con," Congressional Digest, October 1983, Volume 62, Number 10, (Washington DC), p. 227.
3. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc. 1959), p. 30.
4. Ibid., p. 30.
5. Quoted in John A. Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaragua Revolution, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 28.
6. Quoted in Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 31.
7. Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 534.
8. Munro, Intervention, pp. 23, 545-546.
9. Joseph Byrne Lockey, Essays in Pan-Americanism, (Berkeley: California Press, 1939), p. 23.
10. Ibid.
11. William Kamman, A Search For Stability: United States Diplomacy Toward Nicaragua, 1925-1933, (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), p. 1; and see, "Pro-Con," Congressional Digest, p. 228.
12. Ibid., p. 228; Munro, Intervention, p. 113 - Munro, a diplomat of that day, asserts that the Roosevelt Corollary was really the brain child of Secretary of State Elihu Root; and see Lawrence Dennis, "Revolution, Recognition and Intervention," Foreign Affairs, Volume 9, Number 2, January 1931, p. 215.
13. U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Conditions in Nicaragua and Mexico-1927, p. 23.
14. Bartlett, The Record, p. 534.
15. Lejune Cummins, Quijote On A Burro: Sandino and the Marines, (Mexico City: Imprenta Azteca, 1958), p. 5.
16. Richard Millett, Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family (Maryknoll:

Orbis Books, 1977), p. 4; and see, Mark Falcoff, "Somoza, Sandino and the United States: What the Past Teaches - and Doesn't," The World, Number 6, Fall 1983, p. 51.

17. Millett, Guardians, p. 5; Munro, Intervention, p. 37; and see, Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 507-509.

18. Booth, The End, p. 30.

19. Millett, Guardians, p. 5; and see, Munro, Intervention, p. 146.

20. A Brief History of the Relations Between the United States and Nicaragua, 1909-1928, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), p. 44: and see, Munro, Intervention, pp. 152-154.

21. Dennis, "Revolution," p. 220; and see, Charles Evans Hughes, Our Relations to the Nations of the Western Hemisphere, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1928), p. 40.

22. George Black, Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, (London: Zed Press, 1981), p. 7; and see, Richard R. Fagan, "Dateline Nicaragua: The End of the Affair," Foreign Policy, Number 6, Fall 1979, p. 180.

23. Black, Triumph, p. 8.

24. Booth, The End, p. 30.

25. Millett, Guardians, p. 26; and see, Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 18.

26. Ibid, p.8; and see, Isaac Joslin Cox, Nicaragua and the United States 1909-1927, (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Volume X, Number 7, 1927), p. 708.

27. Dennis, "Revolution," p. 208.

28. Black, Triumph, p. 8.

29. Walker, Nicaragua, p. 18.

30. Herbert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning to Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 490.

31. Dana G. Munro, The Five Republics of Central America (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), p. 243.

32. Walker, Nicaragua, pp. 19-20.

33. Munro, Intervention, p. 216; Millett, Guardians, p. 33; and see, Robert H. Ferrell, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: Vol XI - Frank B. Kellogg and Henry L. Stimson (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963), p. 46.

34. Dennis, "Revolution," p. 214; Falcoff, "Somoza," pp. 55-56; and see, Munro, Intervention, p. 207.

35. Millett, Guardians, p. 34.

36. Ibid., pp. 35-36; Cox, Nicaragua, p. 775; and see Henry L. Stimpson, American Policy in Nicaragua (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1970), p. 20.

37. Black, Triumph, p. 12; and see, Cox, Nicaragua, pp. 775-777.

38. Stimpson, American, pp. 23-25.

39. Herring, A History, p. 491.

40. Millett, Guardians, p. 41.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 44; Herring, A History, p. 491; and see, Lawrence E. Harrison, "Nicaraguan Anguish and Costa Rican Progress," The World, Number 6, Fall 1983, p. 36.

43. Millett, Guardians, pp. 41-47; and see, Black, Triumph, p. 12.

44. Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, Dollar Diplomacy at Work in Nicaragua and Mexico, Delivered at Ford Hall, Boston, Mass., March 6, 1927 - Printed in the Congressional Record of March 12, 1927 - (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927), pp. 5-6, (hereafter referred to as Diplomacy at Work).

45. Herring, A History, p. 491; and see, Stimpson, American, p. 32

46. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, Volume II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 294, (hereafter referred to as Foreign Relations).

47. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. A Resolution Requesting Certain Information From the Secretary of the Navy to the use of the Navy in Nicaragua, p. 15 (hereafter referred to as Navy in Nicaragua); also see, Foreign Relations 1925 II, pp. 638-639; and see, Stimpson, American, pp. 35-37.

48. Diplomacy at Work, pp. 5 & 7.

49. Stimpson, American, pp. 49-63.

50. Kamman, A Search, p. 97.

51. Stimpson, American, p. 84; Millett, Guardians, p. 77; Falcoff, "Somoza," p. 56; Booth, The End, p. 41; and see, Herring, A History, p. 491.

52. Bernard Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981), pp. 13-15; It might be

interesting to note that Somoza was Stimpson's official translator during the negotiations of the Pact of Espino Negro. And see, Eduardo Crawley, Dictators Never Die: A Portrait of Nicaragua and the Somozas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. "fly leaf."

53. "Sandino launched his guerrilla campaign against the United States Marines in Nicaragua in 1927, at almost precisely the same time that Mao Tse-tung began his long guerrilla struggle against Chiang Kai-shek in China," Neil Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 9.

54. Ibid., p. 81; Crawley, Dictators, p. 58; and see, Diederich, Somoza, p. 17.

55. Millett, Guardians, pp. 66-67; and see, Macaulay, Sandino, pp. 86-87.

56. Navy in Nicaragua, pp. 1-72.

57. Quoted in Kamman, A Search, p. 135.

58. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

59. Carlton C. Beals, "With Sandino in Nicaragua," The Nation, Vol. 126, February 22, 1928, pp. 204-205; February 29, 1928, pp. 232-233; March 7, 1928, pp. 260-261; and March 28, 1928, pp. 340-341. Beals, in a series of articles, pictured Sandino as a hero struggling against foreign oppressors - the United States Marines. His articles incited members of the All-American Anti-Imperialist League to picket the White House with signs reading: "We are for Sandino and not against him," and "Wall Street and not Sandino is the real bandit, etc.

60. U.S. casualties from 13 December 1926 to 8 February 1928: 16 killed in action and 35 wounded in action., see Navy in Nicaragua, p. 9.

61. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, pp. 105-133.

62. Navy in Nicaragua, p. 60; and see, Kamman, A Search, p. 140.

63. Booth, The End, p. 45.

64. Marvin Goldwert, The Constabulary in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua (Gainsville: United Press, 1962), p. 40 - American casualties for the period 1927-1932 were 135 killed and 66 wounded. Only 48 of the 135 Marine deaths were the direct result of combat action. Sandino lost 647 killed and 379 wounded. The National Guard during the same period had 48 killed and 104 wounded. This would give one the idea that the Marines were doing the majority of the fighting.

65. Ibid., p. 46; Herring, A History, p. 492; Kamman, A Search, p. 217; For an excellent account of Sandino's peace initiatives and negotiations, see Macaulay, Sandino Affair, pp. 235-256; and see Millett, Guardians, pp. 134-135.

66. Millett, Guardians, p. 93.

67. Diederich, Somoza, pp. 17-19; Macaulay, Sandino Affair, Chapter 11 - pp. 242-256; and see "Central America: Fire in the Front Yard?", Great Decisions '82 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1982), p. 31. Note: Sandino's body was never found and the airfield where he was buried has since been named Sandino Airfield - Nicaragua's International Airport.

68. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, p. 257.

69. Ibid., p. 258; Meredith Nicholson, U.S. Legation, Managua, on April 11, 1939 was quoted as saying the following: "The President (Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua) is a man of pleasing personality. He is unfailing affable, ingratiating and persuasive; but he is without stability of opinion as to anything foreign to his selfish aims.... He is a ready speaker in either Spanish or English. Culturally he is a cipher, but he is clever enough to conceal his deficiencies. He seems to know nothing of the science of government or of political history. It may be said that he sees in democracy only a device for easy domination of his country, with abundant opportunities for plunder to the strains of the national anthem." Blair Clark, "Our Client in Nicaragua," The Nation Volume 226, Number 9, March 11, 1978, p. 259.

70. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol I (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 308-310.

71. Jenny Pearce, Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean (London: South End Press, 1981), pp. 22-23.

72. Crawley, Dictators, p. 94.

73. Lester D. Langley, The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1980), p. 149.

74. Pearce, Under the Eagle, pp. 21-22.

75. Black, Triumph, p. 34.

76. Crawley, Dictators, p. 99; Diederich, Somoza, p. 21; and see, Walker, Nicaragua, p. 108.

77. Walker, Nicaragua, p. 110.

78. Ibid., pp. 110-111: Walker particularly condemns the actions of Ambassadors Thomas Whelan (1951-1961) and Turner Shelton (1970-1975). Whelan was a political appointee under Truman. He ingratiated himself so much to the Somozas that they made him a honorary second father and considered him to be "their ambassador" to the U.S. Shelton was appointed by Nixon. His appointment was based on large contributions to the Nixon presidential campaign and also on his friendship to such notables as Bebe Rebozo and Howard Hughes. Neither Whelan nor Shelton spoke Spanish. For another account of this tragic affair in our diplomatic corps, see Whitney T. Perkins, Constraints of Empire: The United States and Caribbean Interventions (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 193.

79. Millett, Guardians, p. 199; and see, Walker, Nicaragua, p. 109.

80. Millett, Guardians, p. 200.

81. Ibid., p. 203.

82. Walker, Nicaragua, p. 28; and see, Diederich, Somoza, p. 50.

83. Falcoff, "Somoza, Sandino," p. 64; and see, Millett, Guardians, p. 224.

84. Ibid.

85. Diederich, Somoza, p. 56; and see, "Central America: Fire in the Front Yard," p. 32. Also a word about Secretary of State Dulles is in order. It would be understating the case to say that Dulles' understanding of the world and the United States interests in Latin America was poor political theory, poor strategy, and poor apprehension of the factual situation. This included a whole range of things from economic interest, national security, to his personal ideology about Communism. Dulles, many believe, re-taught the Latins how to hate the U.S. For an excellent discussion of this, see Martin C. Needler, The United States and the Latin American Revolution (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972), pp. 19-20.

86. Crawley, Dictators, p. 123.

87. Diederich, Somoza, p. 62; and see, Carla Anne Robbins, The Cuban Threat (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983), p. 10.

88. "New Aid to Rebels Denied," (UPI), New York Times, June 7, 1959, p. 28.

89. Dick Steward, Money, Marines and Mission: Recent U.S. - Latin American Policy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1980), pp. 164-174.

90. Ibid.

91. Needler, The United States, pp. 37-46.

92. Black, Triumph, p. 47 - this grant made Nicaragua the eleventh largest recipient of military assistance in Latin America. Between 1946 and 1975, Nicaragua received 23.6 million dollars in MAP and miscellaneous grants and credits. From 1950 to 1975, 4,897 National Guardsmen passed through U.S. training programs; of these, 4,089 were trained locally - the highest number in all of Latin America. Between 1970 and 1975, Nicaragua put 52 graduates through the U.S. Army Infantry and Ranger School, Army Civil Affairs School, Military Police School and the Army's Command and General Staff College - again the highest figure in all of Latin America. From 1970 to 1975, 303 Nicaraguan students passed through the School of the Americas alone.

93. Ibid., pp. 50-52.

94. Fagan, "Dateline Nicaragua," pp. 179-182; Crawley, Dictators, p. 146; Diederich, Somoza, p. 86; and see, Thomas W. Walker, "The Sandinist Victory in Nicaragua," Current History, Volume 78, Number 454, February

1980, p. 57.

95. Millett, Guardians, p. 235.

96. Walker, "The Sandinist," p. 57.

97. Nixon, in an address to the Inter-American Press Association, October 31, 1969, said the following: "The Latin American nations themselves would thus jointly assume a primary role in setting priorities within the Hemisphere, in developing realistic programs, and in keeping their own performance under (their own) critical review." Quoted in Needler, The United States, p. 156; and see Steward, Money, Marines, pp. 205-253.

98. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on United States Relations With Latin America, May 12, 1959, pp. 1-10.

99. Fagan, "Dateline Nicaragua," p. 182; Millett, Guardians, p. 229; and see, "Pro-Con," Congressional Digest, p. 225.

100. William M. LeoGrande, "The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba?" Foreign Affairs, Volume 58, Number 1, Fall 1979, p. 30.

101. Black, Triumph, pp. 58-59; and see, Millett, Guardians, p. 93.

102. Crawley, Dictators, p. 148.

103. Diederich, Somoza, pp. 96-97.

104. Black, Triumph, p. 59.

105. Crawley, Dictators, p. 149; and see, Fagan, "Dateline Nicaragua," p. 181.

106. Millett, Guardians, p. 238.

107. Ibid., p. 240.

108. Black, Triumph, p. 87; and see, Millett, Guardians, pp. 242-244.

109. Penny Lernoux, "Nicaragua's Civil War," The Nation, Volume 227, Number 8, September 16, 1978, p. 231; and see, Arturo J. Cruz, "Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Volume 61, Number 5, Summer 1983, p. 1033.

110. Fagan, "Dateline Nicaragua," pp. 184-189.

111. "Central America," Great Decisions '82, pp. 31-32; and see, Black, Triumph, pp. 173-178. Also, "thanks to the well financed Nicaraguan lobby headed by Rep. Charles Wilson (D. Texas) and to Terence Todman, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Congress reversed an earlier vote, restoring \$3.1 million in U.S. military aid to the Somoza government. In May the same lobby used its leverage to unfreeze \$12.5 million in U.S. loans for non-military and a \$32 million soft loan from the Inter-American Development Bank to construct a road in northern

Nicaragua connecting two military garrisons." Quoted in Lernoux, "Nicaragua's Civil War," p. 231. Also see Pearce, Under the Eagle, pp. 117-119.

112. LeoGrande, "The Revolution," p. 37; and see, Alfred Stepan, "The U.S. and Latin America: Vital Interests and the Instruments," Foreign Affairs, Volume 58, Number 3, America and the World 1979, pp. 680-681.

113. Lernoux, "Nicaragua's Civil War," p. 231.

114. Black, Triumph, pp. 173-180; "Somoza's Final Days," The New Republic, Volume 179, Number 12, September 16, 1978, p. 5; and see, "Fire Storm in Central America," Great Decisions '81, pp. 44-47.

115. Lernoux, "Nicaragua's Civil War," p. 231.

116. Walker, "The Sandinist," p. 58; and see, Fagan, "Dateline Nicaragua," p. 189.

117. Ibid.; Walker, Nicaragua, p. 40; Alan Riding, "Nicaraguan Rebels Take Over Capital, Ending Civil War," New York Times, July 21, 1979, p. 1; and see, Stepan, "The U.S. and Latin America," pp. 679-681. Also for a follow-on story, see Alan Riding, "Managua Welcomes Rebel Government: Congress and Guards Are Disolved and Somoza Holdings Seized," New York Times, July 22, 1979, p. 1.

118. Margaret Daly Hayes, "The Stakes in Central America and U.S. Policy Responses: The Challenge of Central America," Current, Number 245, September 1982, pp. 45-54.

119. Steward, Money, Marines, pp. 249-253; John A. Booth, "Celebrating the Demise of Somocismo," Latin American Research Review, Volume XVII, Number 1, 1982, pp. 177-186; and see, Black, Triumph, pp. 173-180.

120. Diederich, Somoza, pp. 281-328.

121. Walker, "The Sandinist," pp. 59-60.

122. Ernest Evans, "The Reagan Administration's Policy Toward Revolutionary Movements," Conflict Quarterly, Volume III, Number 1, Fall 1982, p. 55.

123. Fred C. Ikle (Guest Columnist), USA TODAY (Washington, D.C.) December 8, 1983, p. 8A. Dr. Ikle stated the following: "If Nicaragua continues on its present course, it will be the bridgehead and arsenal for insurgency in Central America. Its armed forces already far exceed domestic needs. Compared to former President Somoza's 9,000-man National Guard, the Sandinistas have 25,000 in the active armed forces and an additional 50,000 reservists."

124. Alan Riding, "The Central American Quagmire," Foreign Affairs, Volume 61, Number 3, America and the World 1982, p. 642.

125. Cruz, "Nicaragua's Imperiled," pp. 1031-1042; "Pro-Con,"

Congressional Digest, p. 230; and see, Mark B. Rosenberg, "Central America Devastated," Caribbean Review, Volume XIII, Number 2, p. 3.

126. "Pro-Con," Congressional Digest, p. 230.

127. Ibid.

128. James A. Wallace, "Honduras: U.S. Linchpin in Central America," U.S. News & World Report, November 1983, PP. 29-30.

129. Sidney Lens, "Cuba Prepares For an Invasion," The Nation, August 20-27, 1983, pp. 135-136; and see, John C. Quinn (Editor), "Can Sandinistas Change Their Spots?" USA TODAY (Washington, D.C.), December 8, 1983, p. 8A.

130. Richard Stone, "Quotations," USA TODAY (Washington, D.C.), January 9, 1984, p. 10A.

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